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Foreword

At the end of August 2007, I attended a conference in Sibiu, Romania,
entitled “Religious Metaphors and Philosophical Concepts.” The conference was followed by a one-week summer course on the same topic at
the Bancoveanu Monastery in Romania’s Fagaras Mountains. The topic
was good. The presenters were excellent, including John Milbank (University of Nottingham) and Jean-Yves Lacoste (Cambridge University).
There was also someone I’d not heard of before, Jad Hatem (St. Joseph’s
University, Beirut).
After two good days in Sibiu, a young and earnest graduate student
(Paul Terec) drove me down the bumpy road to the monastery in his own
car. On arriving, I settled in and then went for the first night’s dinner in
the refectory. The entrance was narrow, requiring us to line up to pass
through it, and as we were in line I heard someone behind me talking
about Mormons. I couldn’t hear what the person behind me was saying,
but I heard the word Mormons several times and began to anticipate a
problem, at least a tense moment when it became clear that I am a Latterday Saint. I’m not naturally paranoid, but my experience with other
academics concerning Mormonism has infrequently begun with them
thinking good of it.
Entering the refectory, we lined up on two sides of long tables
butted end to end, and when I came to my place, I found myself directly
opposite the person whom I’d heard speaking. “Oh well,” I thought. “I
might as well deal with this at the beginning.” We then went around the
tables, each person introducing himself. When I did so and said, “I’m
from Brigham Young University,” the fellow across the table from me
stood up, reached across to hug me, and said, “BYU! I love Mormons!”
ix
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Needless to say, I was surprised. I hadn’t expected overt hostility, but
I’d expected that response perhaps even less.
The person who had welcomed me so enthusiastically was Professor
Jad Hatem. We talked over dinner and afterward, and as we talked he
told me of a book that he had recently published, Les Trois Néphites, le
Bodhisattva et le Mahdî (Éditions du Cygne, 2007). That is what he had
been talking about behind me in line. It was difficult for me to believe that
a philosopher from Lebanon had heard enough about Mormons to write
about us at all, much less to write about a topic like the Three Nephites.
In the Book of Mormon three of Jesus’s disciples in the ancient
Americas desire to remain on the earth so that, as Jesus says to them,
“ye might bring the souls of men unto me, while the world shall stand”
(3 Nephi 28:9). He grants them that blessing:
Ye shall never taste of death; but ye shall live to behold all the doings of the Father unto the children of men, even until all things
shall be fulfilled according to the will of the Father, when I shall
come in my glory with the powers of heaven. And ye shall never
endure the pains of death; but when I shall come in my glory
ye shall be changed in the twinkling of an eye from mortality to
immortality; and then shall ye be blessed in the kingdom of my
Father. And again, ye shall not have pain while ye shall dwell in
the flesh, neither sorrow save it be for the sins of the world; and
all this will I do because of the thing which ye have desired of me.
(3 Nephi 28:7–9)

Most academic discussions of the Three Nephites investigate their appearances in American folklore, stories of strangers who appear from
nowhere to help those in need. Sometimes they change a flat tire. Sometimes they deliver food. They often appear as hitchhikers. And as soon
as they’ve done their good deed, they disappear. That folklore goes significantly beyond the promised blessing in the scriptural text. Needless
to say, Jesus says nothing to the three disciples about such things as
fixing flat tires. Instead he says they will work to bring souls to Christ,
though who would deny that ordinary good deeds are a large part of
bringing souls to Christ? The folklore focuses on doing good deeds
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more than on conversion, and the folklore is what most people, academic or not, probably think of when they think of the Three Nephites.
But Hatem said he had made a philosophical and theological analysis of the relevant verses in the Book of Mormon rather than an analysis
of folkloric stories about the Three Nephites. After dinner he gave me a
copy of his little volume, and the combination of jet lag and curiosity—
and the need to refer often to my French dictionary—kept me up until
breakfast the next morning. As a result, I wasn’t much good during the
next day’s lectures, but I was excited by Hatem’s book.
Hatem has read the Book of Mormon carefully. He has understood
it, and though he sometimes understands things differently than we
would—he is, after all, not a Mormon—he has understood Mormonism,
and he has offered an original analysis of the passage in 3 Nephi. His
argument is that we should understand the Three Nephites as people
who, like the bodhisattva in the Buddhist traditions and the Mahdi in
Islam, sacrifice their existence not by dying but by consecrating their
existence to others. Whereas Christ died for others, making it possible
to return to the Father, the Three Nephites are preserved to bring the
rest of humanity to him. Mormonism, therefore, understands Christian
life as an imitation of the Three Nephites, even if only implicitly.
Like several recent publications, but published in the original before
most of them, Hatem’s work shows that serious academic reflection is
an appropriate response to the Book of Mormon. Of course, reflection
on Latter-day Saint theology by non–Latter-day Saints will sometimes
disagree with what Latter-day Saints would say. And of course academic
reflection is not necessary for Mormon believers or essential to The Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. The simplicity of the gospel does not
demand philosophical or theological reflection. It requires the simplicity
of faith in Jesus Christ and a change of heart that emanates in a new life.
But the Neal A. Maxwell Institute is dedicated to the assumption that
there is a place for academic reflection on LDS scripture and belief by
both Latter-day Saints and non–Latter-day Saints. So the appearance of
Hatem’s book as the first volume in a series from the Institute dedicated
to the rigors of theory and the riches of scripture is entirely appropriate.
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By analyzing the story of the Three Nephites, and especially by comparing it to similar beliefs in Buddhism and Islam, Jad Hatem shows us
one way of thinking about the Book of Mormon: it has a profound ethical
and soteriological teaching about the necessity of self-sacrifice. Hatem’s
approach is original, especially in that it focuses on a story that many
Mormons consider marginal to the book’s message. He makes the case
that the brief story is emblematic of that message. For me, Hatem turned
the Book of Mormon account of the Three Nephites from something
that I paid little attention to into a central metaphor for Christian life.
Readers will not find this book light reading. It engages contemporary academic theological and philosophical thought in its own terms.
It looks at Mormonism from a non–Latter-day Saint point of view. It is
a comparative work as well as a careful reflection on the Three Nephites,
so it discusses beliefs of religions with which many English speakers
may be unfamiliar. Hatem thinks broadly and creatively, comparing and
commenting on religions and literatures. So Hatem’s argument takes us
along a path to which we must pay attention because, along the way of
that path, he takes philosophical and theological excursions. If we confuse the excursions with the path, we will have difficulty understanding
what he is saying. This is a style of writing to which most Americans are
not accustomed.
This book was written in French by a Lebanese Maronite Catholic.
Different language groups and cultures have different styles of writing,
so Postponing Heaven is an intersection of several different styles: contemporary French philosophy and Maronite Catholic experience among
them. The fact that it is a translation into English further complicates
matters. So readers will find that this book is written in a style foreign
to those accustomed to Anglophonic rhetoric. Such things may be hurdles for readers, but they are not insurmountable. In the end, the argument of Postponing Heaven: The Three Nephites, the Bodhisattva, and the
Mahdi is well worth the slow and reflective reading that it will require.
In places its writing is beautiful. Throughout, its ideas are as well.
James E. Faulconer

Translator’s Preface

I do not wish to embellish the borders of this remarkable little book with impertinent observations about my own modest part in
making it over for an English-reading audience. In that spirit, I will let
the occasional translator’s note attend to the occasional snip or snare,
and here indulge only in a brief comment about the overall work of
translation that has been my privilege.
Translation is, of course, an act of both imitation and interpretation.
Done well, it is at once artful and scholarly, but it is most of all an act of
faith. A translator has to be faithful to both the style and substance of
the original work. But faithfulness to the source is compounded with a
second fidelity to the reader’s ear and thus to the reader’s tongue. Translation is a reworking of the original in new and often stubborn cloth.
Hatem’s style is rich, deep, unself-conscious, variously inflected
with the playfulness of Continental thought and a further playfulness
all his own, and is therefore highly and pleasingly personal. Some of the
play—rhythmic, alliterative, allusive—resists translation, threatening
garishness or stiffness in coming over, such that the dual fidelities of
translation require turning out certain complex phrases in homelier
English cloth, and other, plainer phrases spun in muslin, chintz, or
mukayyar. At times, fidelity requires loosening a knot or two, and at
others, tying off errant strands. But on balance, the voice you read in
this book is Hatem’s, unaccented.
The material is similarly complex and rich, and Hatem’s knowledge of the traditions he interrogates is extensive, expert, and easy.
Stepping back now and then from some very spirited sentences, I have
been impressed by the beauty and sympathy with which he treats the
xiii
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figures—human, messianic, and divine—that populate the work, and
the systems of belief in which they operate. He is respectful and clearsighted, fascinating because he is fascinated by it all himself. His intersection of just these traditions and just these figures in just these ways
is compelling and unique, and I predict its lasting place in religious
scholarship.
The book is his, but insofar as I have been privileged to help bring
it to a broader audience, my own thanks go to many at Salt Press, who
set the project going, and at the Maxwell Institute, whose work it has
become. But thanks especially to Joseph Spencer and James Faulconer,
without whose efforts and expertise the translation would be little more
than an amateur effort. And thanks, of course, to Jad Hatem for his
patience and for allowing me the privilege of worrying the fabric of his
thought in fits and starts for so long. I hope he, and you, will like the
cut and carriage of it.
Jonathon Penny, PhD

Introduction
And if thou draw out thy soul to the hungry, and satisfy the afflicted soul; then shall thy light rise in obscurity, and thy darkness
be as the noonday. (Isaiah 58:10)

I speak here of “human messianicity,” by which I mean the disposition to desire to save others. As an “existential,” in other words as
belonging to the general theoretical structure of human being prior
to any voluntary personal decision, human messianicity is part of the
ethical constitution of human being and therefore finds expression in
both ordinary and exceptional situations.1 Messianicity is an acute form
of human virtue—the jen of the Confucian school radicalized by Mencius, who said that “every man is given a heart that cannot bear the
suffering of others. . . . It would be inhuman not to feel compassion.”2
Knowing how to enlarge the compassion we feel for those we perceive
to include compassion for those we cannot perceive—achieving universality of compassion—is everything. In Chinese, the logogram jen (仁,
1. I have developed this concept of messianicity (messianité) in two French-language
publications: Jad Hatem, Semer le Messie selon Fondane poète [Sowing the Messiah: The
poetry of Fondane] (Brussels: La Part de l’oeil, 2004); and Jad Hatem, Théologie de l’oeuvre
d’art mystique et messianique: Thérèse d’Avila, Andreï Rublev, Michel Henry [The mystical
and messianic work of art: Theresa of Ávila, Andrei Rublev, Michel Henry] (Brussels:
Lessius, 2006), particularly chapter 1, section 3. The aim of this book is not to insist on
divine or hierarchical messianicity—rather it is, in part, to establish an anthropological
basis for divine messianicity (without which Christology would be unthinkable) and
more especially to attend to human messianicity, its understudied corollary.
2. Mencius II.A.6. The translation used here is Mencius, trans. D. C. Lau (New
York: Penguin, 2003), 38. Jen, which can be translated as “goodness” or “goodwill,” is
defined by Cheng Yi as the impartiality that puts itself in the shoes of others.
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pronounced “ren”) embodies this idea since it is composed of both the
character for “man” (人) and the figure for “two” (二): jen is grounded
in simply being-with.
It seems right to see this messianic ethic as one of two sources of
religion (the other being the mystical). But it is not always easy to locate the messianic core in a religious tradition. In some religions, the
deposit is rather meager. In most, it is veiled by a movement of mercy
that leads to Incarnation: a divine messianicity. Human messianicity
is, therefore, all the more precious when we find it unalloyed with the
divine. Properly understood, Christianity commingles both.3
I intend to place this existential, human messianicity in relation
with a desire [vœu]4 for longevity of earthly life. Messianicity is challenged by this desire in every soul, which more often than not overshadows the desire to help others. The desire to perpetuate one’s life
might manifest as egoism, as in Honoré de Balzac’s The Elixir of Life, or
more plainly as a fear of death, as in Simone de Beauvoir’s All Men Are
Mortal. Either way, it is helpful to recall the contempt in which such
projects are sometimes held: if successful, they can feel like a curse;
gaining life can feel like losing death. This is the fate of the Wandering
Jew, a ragged phantom of time, condemned both to die with the last
man and, according to Klingemann, to “neither hate nor love anyone.”5

3. In a Feuerbachian approach, one would expect to find only human messianicity,
merely projected on the divine. Besides being reductive, this approach does not explain
how in the person of Christ both the human and divine intersect.
4. Translator’s note: Hatem’s vœu can mean both “vow” and “wish.” His use of the
term throughout the book seems to embrace both senses severally and implies other,
dimensionally related notions: longing, desire, oath, covenant, invocation, and prayer.
“Wish” extends the concept of desire—desire to live in order to serve—and “vow” informs the sacramental and covenantal nature of that life once granted or achieved. The
earnestness of the wish and its sacramental nature together suggest the word prayer.
For the purposes of lexical clarity, where I have translated the word as something other
than “vow” according to context, I have inserted “[vœu]” to anchor the text to Hatem’s
central conceit. I should also note that vœu more consistently conveys the promissory
force of a “vow” as the first chapter develops.
5. Ernst A. F. Klingemann, Ahasver (Brunswick: Meyer, 1827), 122.
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Despair threatens every effort at saving others bereft of a divine
mandate (a mission formally conferred) or of a metaphysical guarantee
(the assurance of nirvana), for without at least one of these, success is
uncertain. The setbacks typical of a path lined with traps and betrayals
may weary and ultimately tempt the sojourner to abandon the path.
Notably, the proposed paradigm for thinking messianicity does not
include those who have endowed themselves with prolonged life (as opposed to those who receive it as a gift)—even if, as in Taoism, they have
healed the sick through spiritual concentration or meditation6—for the
very good reason that they have not done so with the aim of succoring
the creatures they heal. Indeed, as in the celebrated case of Lu Tong-Pin,
they have only performed good works as a requirement for achieving
the immortality they covet for themselves: compassion is just a means
for them. For the human messiah, blessing others is the end.7
These preliminary considerations sketch the concepts most salient
to the central preoccupation of this book: a human messianicity that
obtains an indefinite extension of life, but that does so within a religious
framework. The approach is comparative in order to underline the specific
character and conditions of this preoccupation and to bring its implications into full flower. Three particular types are examined: (1) the saved,
who resolve to serve humankind (exemplified by the Three Nephites);
(2) the self-awakened, who boldly and with resolute heart consecrate
themselves to the liberation of other creatures (the bodhisattva); and
(3) the righteous, responsible for the world and the establishment of the
reign of justice (the Mahdi). Accordingly, the book primarily examines
Mormonism, Mahāyāna or “Great Vehicle” Buddhism, and Twelver
Shiʿism.
6. Cf. The Book of Chuang Tzu, chapter 1.
7. The T’ai-Shang Kan-Ying P’ien (The Treatise on the Response of the Tao) tells us
that “in order to be immortalized in heaven, one must perform one thousand, three
hundred good deeds; to be immortalized on earth requires three hundred such.” Translated from the French rendering by A. Remusat (Paris: Geuthner, 1939), 68. This is just
one recipe among many others: taking potions, drugs, and cinnabar; scaling this or
that holy mountain; and even, as in the case of the woman Ho Sien-Kou, receiving into
oneself the sperm of an immortal will also do nicely.
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The Three Nephites
The Book of Mormon reports the particulars of Christ’s postresurrection ministry to the Nephites, an Israelite people established on
the American continent centuries before, at which time Christ chooses
from among them twelve disciples. Toward the end of his New World
ministry, Christ addresses a question to these Nephite Twelve:
And it came to pass when Jesus had said these words, he spake
unto his disciples, one by one, saying unto them: What is it that
ye desire of me, after that I am gone to the Father? And they all
spake, save it were three, saying: We desire that after we have lived
unto the age of man, that our ministry, wherein thou hast called
us, may have an end, that we may speedily come unto thee in thy
kingdom. And he said unto them: Blessed are ye because ye desired this thing of me; therefore, after that ye are seventy and two
years old ye shall come unto me in my kingdom; and with me ye
shall find rest. (3 Nephi 28:1–3)

The desire expressed by these nine disciples is neither astonishing
nor very different from the request the mother of James and John makes
in the New Testament, which appeal offends the other ten apostles: that
her sons take their places in the heavenly kingdom at the right and left
hands of Jesus (Matthew 20:21, 24).
The Book of Mormon text continues:

5
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And when he had spoken unto them [the nine], he turned himself unto the three, and said unto them: What will ye that I should
do unto you, when I am gone unto the Father? And they sorrowed
in their hearts, for they durst not speak unto him the thing which
they desired.
And he said unto them: Behold, I know your thoughts, and ye
have desired the thing which John, my beloved, who was with me
in my ministry, before that I was lifted up by the Jews, desired of
me. Therefore, more blessed are ye, for ye shall never taste of death;
but ye shall live to behold all the doings of the Father unto the children of men, even until all things shall be fulfilled, according to the
will of the Father, when I shall come in my glory with the powers
of heaven. And ye shall never endure the pains of death; but when
I shall come in my glory ye shall be changed in the twinkling of an
eye from mortality to immortality; and then shall ye be blessed in
the kingdom of my Father.
And again, ye shall not have pain while ye shall dwell in the
flesh, neither sorrow save it be for the sins of the world; and all
this will I do because of the thing which ye have desired of me, for
ye have desired that ye might bring the souls of men unto me,
while the world shall stand. And for this cause ye shall have fulness
of joy; and ye shall sit down in the kingdom of my Father; yea, your
joy shall be full, even as the Father hath given me fulness of joy;
and ye shall be even as I am, and I am even as the Father; and the
Father and I are one. (3 Nephi 28:4–10)

This episode clearly alludes to the biblical pericope where Peter,
asking the resurrected Lord what would become of the beloved disciple
(whom, for convenience, I will call John), receives the answer: “If I will
that he tarry till I come, what is that to thee?” (John 21:22). The brethren
take Jesus’s response as a promise of immortality, but what follows in the
text contradicts such a reading: “Yet Jesus said not unto him, He shall
not die; but, If I will that he tarry till I come, what is that to thee?” (John

The Vow

7

21:23). The text does not predict that the apostle in question would live an
abnormally long life, but rather that Christ would return within the span
of a human life.1 This simple echo of a pronouncement of Jesus reported
by the synoptics—“There be some of them that stand here, which shall not
taste of death, till they have seen the kingdom of God come with power”
(Mark 9:1)—sets John apart and preserves him from martyrdom so that
he would survive to see Christ’s return.2 Christ did not return within a
generation, however, and John was interred at Ephesus. A certain legend
resolves the apparent contradictions: John, Christ’s Minister of the Word,
merely sleeps while he waits for the Day of the Lord.3
The Book of Mormon bears witness of John’s longevity in its own
way. Does this suggest that its author did not want to take into account
the denial recorded in the Gospel of John? Let us say rather that he
inscribed his account with a new sense of the nearness of the Lord’s
coming, one that took shape after the parousia had been deferred and
that lends its name to the community founded by Joseph Smith: the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. As the risen Christ did not
come again in the first centuries of the Christian era, John’s longevity
necessarily became extraordinary. To reconcile this new order of things
with the text of the Gospel, Joseph Smith needed only to invoke an inspired “translation” of the verses. We know that the Pearl of Great Price,
part of the canon of Mormon scripture, includes liberal adaptations
of Genesis and Matthew, intending to restore their exact meanings, to
reveal their cores, and to wipe away the supposed improvements and

1. For a number of exegetes, a certain instability in the formulation of these verses
leaves one to think that their redactor seems to refute the implication of immortality for
the beloved disciple or to justify his death, which occurred before the glorious return
of Christ.
2. The Three Nephites evidently renounce the glory of martyrdom.
3. This is a late tradition known by Augustine. See his Tractates on the Gospel of
John, 124.22.

8 Postponing Heaven

inevitable errors of the copyists.4 Smith undertook such a revision of
the Gospel of John as well.5
But we have at our disposal a document much more prestigious
than a revision, however inspired, of the Johannine verses. In this document, instead of Peter soliciting the Lord for information about John’s
blessing, John himself pleads with Christ to let him live until Christ
returns, not as a witness of his own election, but as a sacrifice permitting
him to tirelessly spread the good news and to serve, without ceasing,
his fellow beings. The autobiography of Joseph Smith reproduces the
text of a revelation given him in April 1829 concerning the question
of the beloved disciple’s survival. Remarkably, this document (another
Apocryphon of John?) is supposed to have been written by the beloved
disciple himself and then concealed in order to be brought to light much
later, in much the same way as the Book of Mormon. Here is the text:
And the Lord said unto me: John, my beloved, what desirest thou?
For if you shall ask what you will, it shall be granted unto you.
And I said unto him: Lord, give unto me power over death, that
I may live and bring souls unto thee. And the Lord said unto me:
Verily, verily, I say unto thee, because thou desirest this thou shalt
tarry until I come in my glory, and shalt prophesy before nations,
kindreds, tongues and people.

4. Although the Bible is included by the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints
in its corpus of canonical scripture, Mormons, like their founder, consider the Book of
Mormon to be “the most correct of any book on earth, and the keystone of our religion.”
See Joseph Smith Jr., History of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, ed. B. H.
Roberts, 7 vols., 2nd ed. (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book, 1978), 4:461; Scott G. Kenney,
ed., Wilford Woodruff ’s Journal, 1833–1898, Typescript (Midvale, UT: Signature Books,
1983), 2:139 (November 28, 1841).
5. Smith’s description of “translating St. John’s Gospel” is found in the heading of
Doctrine and Covenants, section 76, which was adapted from “History of the Church”
(manuscript), book A-1, p. 183, Church Archives, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latterday Saints, Salt Lake City, Utah. For Smith’s revision of John, see Scott H. Faulring, Kent
P. Jackson, and Robert J. Matthews, eds., Joseph Smith’s New Translation of the Bible:
Original Manuscripts (Provo, UT: Religious Studies Center, Brigham Young University,
2004), 442–67.
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And for this cause the Lord said unto Peter: If I will that he
tarry till I come, what is that to thee? For he desired of me that he
might bring souls unto me, but thou desiredst that thou mightest
speedily come unto me in my kingdom. I say unto thee, Peter, this
was a good desire; but my beloved has desired that he might do
more, or a greater work yet among men than what he has before
done. Yea, he has undertaken a greater work; therefore I will make
him as flaming fire and a ministering angel; he shall minister for
those who shall be heirs of salvation who dwell on the earth. And
I will make thee to minister for him and for thy6 brother James;
and unto you three I will give this power and the keys of this
ministry until I come. Verily I say unto you, ye shall both have
according to your desires, for ye both joy in that which ye have
desired. (D&C 7:1–8)

Here it is John, in person, who takes it upon himself to correct the verses
of the Gospel that bears his name.
The date of the revelation is not insignificant. This was the month
Joseph Smith began to dictate the translation of the Book of Mormon to
Oliver Cowdery—whom he had recently met and with whom he would
be ordained by Peter, James, and John.7 The appearance of the idea of
the Three Nephites must, therefore, be exactly contemporaneous with
the resolution of the Johannine enigma. So it is natural to suppose that
the writing of the Book of Mormon began with 3 Nephi, which seems
to me the generative starting point of the whole enterprise.
The autobiography indicates that the revelation followed a difference of opinion between Oliver Cowdery and Joseph Smith about how
to know whether John was dead or still living. They decided to consult the writings of the apostle. The History of the Church does not say
6. This should read “his,” unless “brother” can be taken in a larger, moral sense.
7. Oliver Cowdery briefly described the translation of the Book of Mormon and
the appearance of the Jewish apostles Peter, James, and John in a series of letters intended
to be published in the Messenger and Advocate between 1834 and 1835. See Karen Lynn
Davidson, David J. Whittaker, Mark Ashurst-McGee, and Richard L. Jensen, eds., Histories, Volume 1: Joseph Smith Histories, 1832–1844 (Salt Lake City: Church Historian’s
Press, 2012), 38–44. See also Doctrine and Covenants 27:12–13.
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which of them held which hypothesis, but I do not doubt in the least
that Joseph was in favor of the miraculous,8 for it has the virtue both
of explaining John’s fate as rendered in the Book of Mormon and of
throwing a light on the spirit of the Prophet himself: a spirit imbued
with messianicity.9
I should also note that the two scenes—in which John and the Three
Nephites are granted their desires—correspond by design, so much
so that John’s vow is supposed to have taken place shortly before that
of the Three Nephites. This is, among other things, isomorphism, one of
the salient traits of the composition of the Book of Mormon, which
sees the risen Christ instituting another group of twelve disciples in a
new Holy Land.10

8. There is in the longing of the Three Nephites something like a regulative ideal,
so Joseph Smith will not empirically express a desire [vœu] for longevity of service,
though this will not stop the faithful from believing that he will not taste death: “Some
has supposed that Br Joseph Could not die but this is a mistake it is true their has been
times when I have had the promise of my life to accomplish such & such things, but
having accomplish those things I have not at present any lease of my life I am as liable to
die as other men.” Andrew F. Ehat and Lyndon W. Cook, eds., The Words of Joseph Smith:
The Contemporary Accounts of the Nauvoo Discourses of the Prophet Joseph (Provo, UT:
Religious Studies Center, Brigham Young University, 1980), 112.
9. To give but one example of messianicity in Joseph’s thought: “Love is one of
the chief characteristics of Deity, and ought to be manifested by those who aspire to
be the sons of God. A man filled with the love of God, is not content with blessing his
family alone, but ranges through the whole world, anxious to bless the whole human
race.” History of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 4:227; from a letter from
Joseph Smith to the Twelve, December 15, 1840, Nauvoo, Illinois, published in Times
and Seasons (January 1, 1841): 258 (incorrectly dated October 19, 1840, in History of
the Church).
10. This is not to mention other institutions put in place by Joseph Smith. I should
note that the twelve Nephite disciples have an inferior status to that of the twelve Jewish
apostles. And it is equally notable that, according to the texts written after the Book of
Mormon, God created many worlds (see D&C 76:24; Moses 1:39). If these other worlds
are peopled by humans, it is consistent to conclude that at his resurrection, Christ also
visited them and instituted other quorums of twelve. The existence of other planets
to which “translated” men might be sent in the guise of angels charged with a specific
ministry was, in fact, discussed in a sermon given by Joseph in 1840. See Ehat and Cook,
Words of Joseph Smith, 41.
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Another number shows up as well, though slightly altered: three.
Although Peter and James did not live excessively long lives, they were
charged with assisting John from heaven. This is why they received, with
him, a singular priestly consecration—doubtless to the Melchizedek
Priesthood—and with it the key of the knowledge of God,11 which Joseph
Smith learned was held by the three apostles (Peter, James, and John)12
and which they would soon confer on him.13 Yet if, as Gabriel Marcel
profoundly observes, “the most consecrated are the most willing,”14 the
heart of the matter is consecration as such.15 John’s vocation, different
as it is from the ministry of the Three Nephites, may well present messianic qualities.
The idea we encounter in the Book of Mormon of postponing
the blessings of heaven is all the more worthy of interest for not being
drawn from the New Testament, even though Paul, in declaring his
desire to be anathema16 and cut off from Christ if it would bless his
people (see Romans 9:3), might be said to reinforce it. That is, although
Paul and the Three Nephites share a messianicity ready to renounce

11. See Doctrine and Covenants 84:19. Although the Aaronic Priesthood is responsible for the gospel of repentance and baptism (see D&C 13), it has never been
“restored” by anyone but Joseph Smith and, strictly speaking, would not have been given
to non-Levites in antiquity.
12. The exact date of the conferral of the Melchizedek Priesthood by Peter, James,
and John upon Joseph Smith and Oliver Cowdery is not found in the extant sources.
See the discussion in History of the Church, 1:40–42. The ordination is accounted for in
Doctrine and Covenants 27:12. Note that the three Jewish apostles—witnesses to the
transfiguration and the resurrection of Jairus’s daughter—constitute the intimate circle
Jesus invited to Gethsemane.
13. We learn elsewhere that the presiding Twelve of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints hold certain keys exclusively (see D&C 112:15–16).
14. See Gabriel Marcel, Being and Having, trans. Katherine Farrer (Westminster:
Dacre, 1949), 127, translation modified.
15. Translator’s note: Hatem plays on the several meanings of consécration and
employs Marcel to the same end. The word indicates severally, in order of use, “ordination,” “devotion” or “dedication,” and “setting apart.”
16. That is to say “cut off ” or “accursed.” In the Septuagint, anathema takes the
place of the Hebrew herem, meaning “destined for total destruction”—destruction that
includes erasure from God’s memory.
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salvation without hesitation, the ways and means diverge. In the first
place, the Nephites renounce salvation temporarily. In the second, Paul
does not ask for an extension of life because the fulfillment of his desire
[vœu] would take no more than an instant. Third, out of modesty, the
Nephites hardly dare express their desire, whereas the whole force of
Paul’s desire is in solemn declaration: he would like to win over the Jews
by an impetuous love that dares to desire the undesirable. One can also
appreciate these nuances by recourse to the distinction between two
modes of substitution: one in the place of others and one beneath others.17 Paul sees himself in the first of these modes; the Three Nephites
see themselves in the second. This same distinction reveals the special
messianic features of the permanent ministry of the Three Nephites.
Their stewardship is a continual presence of Christ among his people, of
solicitude and succor—let us say, of phoria (in other words, of bearing
and being, as in the root of the words euphoria and dysphoria).
The Three Nephites are the three mysterious pillars upon which the
church is built. Their vocation is not vicarious physical suffering and
certainly not vicarious death. But are they, for all that, delivered from
every thorn in the flesh? Not if by this we understand something other
than bodily pain or natural weakness. Not if by this we understand not
only the fatigue occasioned by their apostolic mission—of which Joseph
Smith declared that “translation obtains deliverance from the tortures
and sufferings of the body but their existence will prolong as to their
labors and toils of the ministry before they can enter into so great a rest
and glory”18—but also affective suffering, for surely they carry a wound:
one caused by iniquity. Indeed, it is said, “Therefore, that they might not
taste of death there was a change wrought upon their bodies, that they
might not suffer pain nor sorrow save it were for the sins of the world”
(3 Nephi 28:38, emphasis added).
A substantial modification to their metabolism must be imagined in
support of Mormon theologian Bruce R. McConkie’s thesis that blood
17. Cf. Jad Hatem, Mystique et philosophie mêlées [Mysticism and philosophy
mingled] (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2005), chapter 1, section 2.
18. Ehat and Cook, Words of Joseph Smith, 42.
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does not circulate any more in the bodies of “translated” beings who,
once translated, may uniquely live within the physical and metaphysical
worlds at the same time.19 This would imply great speed of movement,
but not ubiquity of presence. The Three Nephites, having from this
point on qualities of the angels, obtain the power to show themselves
to anyone they like (3 Nephi 28:30). Let me add that the devil has no
power over them, for “there was a change wrought upon them, insomuch that Satan could have no power over them, that he could not
tempt them; and they were sanctified in the flesh, that they were holy,
and that the powers of the earth could not hold them” (3 Nephi 28:39).

The Mahdi
Under these conditions, the fate of the Three Nephites invites a comparison with that of the Twelfth Imam of Twelver Shiʿism: the Mahdi, son of
Hassan al-Askari. Like other immaculate Imams (maʿsūm), he is twice
mediator, as the face by which Allah is approached,20 and as the Ark of
Salvation,21 insofar as he derives from the Creator’s mercy spread over
his creatures.22 Guided himself,23 the Mahdi guides his people toward

19. See Bruce R. McConkie, The Millennial Messiah (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book,
1982), 644.
20. See Ibn Bābūya, Kamāl al-dīn wa-tamām al-niʿmah (Beirut: Al-Aʿlamī, 2004),
222. “He who knows us, knows Allah,” the Imams’ refrain (ibid., 248, translated from
Hatem’s rendering in French). Or again: “By our manner of worship Allah is worshiped.”
Ibn Bābūya, Kitāb al-tawḥīd (Tehran: n. p., 1978), 152 (translated from Hatem’s rendering in French).
21. In Arabic, the safinat al-najāt. See Muhammad ibn Ibrahim al-Nuʿmānī, Kitāb
al-ghaybat (Qom: n. p., 2005), 37.
22. Ibn Bābūya, Kamāl al-dīn wa-tamām al-niʿmah, 198.
23. This is the first sense of the word Mahdi and one that applies to all Twelve
Imams, but it does not convey the total register of signification in the Arabic word.
Changing the voice from passive to active is common, as if Mahdi were merely a synonym for hadi (guide). It was said of the Fifth Imam, Muhammad al-Bāqir, that “he
is called the Mahdi because he will guide us to a hidden reality.” Al-Nuʿmānī, K’itāb
al-ghaybat, 243 (translated from Hatem’s rendering in French). For more on the title
hadi, see ibid., 232.
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paradise.24 Keeper of the initiatory knowledge, he is the exegete par
excellence of the divine verses.25 His presence on the earth is necessary
in order to guard against annihilation, because he is the pillar of the
world. “The world is never without an Imam, declared one among them,
Jaffar al-Saddik, because without him, it would be undone.”26 It is by the
Mahdi that Allah keeps the sky from falling to the earth.27 His absence,
even for an hour,28 even for the blink of an eye,29 would be catastrophic.
The Mahdi is reminiscent of the Jewish tradition of the thirty-six
righteous men—the Lamed-Vav Tzaddiqim—by whose merits the world
continues to exist.30 Like the Three Nephites and the Mahdi, the Tzaddiqim lead a hidden existence entirely devoted to safeguarding creation.
And as with their Mormon and Islamic counterparts, being unknown
does not prevent them from radiating light and heat, any more than
veiling cloud interrupts the sun.31 But unlike their counterparts, they
24. Ibn Bābūya, Kamāl al-dīn wa-tamām al-niʿmah, 198.
25. Among the stories about the Mahdi’s important future acts, one point of comparison deserves attention, even though it does not directly address our topic. Following
the instructions of the angel Moroni, Joseph Smith purportedly unearthed the Book of
Mormon, which had been buried on the American continent in the fifth century after
Christ. It is also said that the Mahdi is called by that name because he will be guided
(yuhdā) toward a hidden reality and will retrieve the Torah and the Gospels from a
land called Antioch (variant: from a mountain in Syria) in order to be able to judge
the Jews and the Christians by their own books. See Al-Asfahānī, Muʿjam al-malāhim
wa-l-fitan (Tehran: n.p., 2002), 1:199. There is an obvious difference here: the Torah
and the Gospels the Mahdi discovers are unaltered, familiar texts, whereas according
to the angel, the Book of Mormon, said to contain the fulness of the eternal gospel, is
obscure. But there is also another similarity: Joseph Smith held that the supreme Father
will judge those who possess a law according to the terms of that law, and will judge
without recourse to a law those who live without one. See the editorial published in the
Times and Seasons (April 15, 1842): 759; History of the Church, 4:595–96.
26. Quoted in Muhammad Yaʿqūb al-Kulaynī, Usūl al-kāfī (Beirut: Dāt al-adwā,
1992), 1:234.
27. Ibn Bābūya, Kamāl al-dīn wa-tamām al-niʿmah, 199.
28. Al-Nuʿmānī, Kitāb al-ghaybat, 140, 144.
29. Ibn Bābūya, Kamāl al-dīn wa-tamām al-niʿmah, 197.
30. See Babylonian Talmud Sanhedrin 97ab.
31. This is said of the Mahdi, the hidden Imam, in Muhammad Baqir Majlesi,
Bihār al-Anwār (Beirut: Al-Wafāʾ, 1983), 52:92–93. Too much sunlight dazzles and
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do not enjoy longevity: the Eternal is content to raise up replacements
of the same moral quality in perpetuity. Mystical Islam has its own
version of the Tzaddiqim: the abdāl. But Mormonism has no need of
such figures, and even among the Shiʿites the tradition of the abdāl
came to an end with the Twelfth Imam, whose mission will end only
with time itself. The first eleven Imams, however, reached the hereafter
in succession, as the nine Nephite disciples did (in their case, almost
simultaneously).
It is important to note that the indefinite extension of earthly life is
not immortality in any strict sense, which is God’s prerogative, as the
Apostle Paul is wont to underscore (see 1 Timothy 6:16). The Qurʾan
proclaims, “Every soul shall taste of death” (3:185; 21:35). Without divine consideration, the Shiʿite Mahdi would be assassinated. He is capable of dying. The same is true of the Three Nephites, who will, Christ
promises, put on incorruptibility in the blink of an eye at the time of
his Second Coming; although this change is instantaneous, it is a kind
of death, for death is inscribed in all flesh (see 2 Nephi 9:4, 6).
The possibility of death is thus constitutive of every human, but this
does not mean that every human dies,32 nor does it stop us from imagining an alternative material transformation, as in the case of the Three
Nephites. One tradition relating to the Mahdi holds that he will have
the body of a forty-year-old man until his death.33 Another claims that,
like other Imams, he will not cast a shadow.34 One would rightly reckon
that in the way of Adam in Eden, the Mahdi is never ill.35 But we cannot
say, as we can of the Taoist saints, that his existence is nothing but life.36

inflicts blindness—that is to say, ignorance (see ibid., 94).
32. Or even all humans. Saint Augustine asserts that, during his paradisiacal existence, Adam possessed both mortality (by nature) and immortality (by grace) at once,
for “poterat non mori”—he could not die. See Augustine, The Literal Meaning of Genesis
VI.25–26. It was sin that introduced death.
33. See Ibn Bābūya, Kamāl al-dīn wa-tamām al-niʿmah, 591.
34. See Shafīq Jarādī, Rashaḥat̄ wilāʾīyah (Beirut: n. p., 2006), 66.
35. See Augustine, City of God XIV.26.
36. See Lao Tzu, Tao Te Ching, 50.
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His condition is distinguishable from that of the thirty-six tzaddiqim, who wait for the Messiah’s irruption in history, and from the
Three Nephites, who attend his glorious return, because in Twelver
Shiʿism, the Mahdi is himself the object of eschatological hope. Does he,
in some way, control history? In some measure, yes—for if, as Kulaynī
reports, the Imams die only when they choose to,37 the Mahdi could
come from among them at the last day to hasten the end of time (the
old tradition requires that he live a mere twenty years or so after the
establishment of his reign). But since the Mahdi is not Allah himself, he
remains subject to a higher jurisdiction, and in this way he resembles
the Jewish Messiah.
As to whether or not earthly existence constitutes, in the Mahdi’s eyes, a sacrifice, we can only speculate. One Shiʿite tradition asserts that during the battle of Karbalā, which saw the Mahdi’s ancestor,
Imam Hussein, and almost his entire family massacred, the Imam had
to choose between an angelic intervention on his behalf and the final
encounter with God.38 His preference for the latter shows in him the
prevalence of the mystical over the ethical; in the Mahdi, however, the
contrary pertains: the mystical is subordinate to the ethical.
With this in mind, we ought to distinguish the reasons for his Occultation, or his becoming hidden (the Minor in 874 ce, the Major in
941 ce), from the reasons for the extension of his life. The oldest of his
followers, naturally ignorant of this extension, explained the Mahdi’s
concealment as a result of his fear of being killed,39 carrying death (as
Valéry puts it) as “a secret child already fully formed.”40 Even were the
Mahdi to live to a venerable age, his death would be premature (a mors
immatura).

37. See al-Kulaynī, Usūl al-Kāfī, 1:258–60.
38. See ibid., 1:319.
39. Ibid., 1:398–99, 401. Cf. Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan Mahdī, Adʿiyat al-Imām
al-Mahdi (Beirut: Dār al-Murtadā, 2000), 44.
40. La Jeune Parque.
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But this episode also invokes a test of denial to which Shiʿites were
required to submit,41 which, from the Occultation on, has tended principally to the biblical and cosmic (notably zodiacal) symbolism of the
number twelve, revived by a remark attributed to the Prophet Muhammad,
in fulfillment of which twelve vicars born to his tribe—the Quraysh—
would succeed him.42 If there could not be a Thirteenth Imam, and if
the lightsome Advent were delayed, the Twelfth would have to remain
in place as the Proof for God and his justice before the believers and as
Living Qurʾan among them in order to guide and heal them;43 to protect
and even to embellish their being by his presence;44 to make ready for the
plan, for the moment God has chosen45 to avenge the Prophet’s family
of the cruel and immoral humiliations they suffered; and at the end of
an eschatological struggle, to fill the world as much with justice as it had
been previously filled with iniquity and tyranny.46 Since human history
itself cannot justify terminating the immoral life by constituting a civil
society that administers rights universally, it will fall to the Mahdi to

41. Cf. Ibn Bābūya, ʿIlal al-sharāʾiʿ wa-l-ahkām (Najaf: n.p., 1966), 1:244. See also
Abū Jaʿfar al-Tūsī, Kitāb al-ghaybat (Beirut: Muassasat dār al-kitāb, 1988), 203 (on the
motif of sifting: 206); al-Nuʿmānī, Kitāb al-ghaybat, 24, 170, 210–12.
42. Cf. al-Nuʿmānī, Kitāb al-ghaybat, 65–104.
43. See Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr, Tārīkh al-ghaybah al-sughrá (Qom: n.p., 2006),
126.
44. For example, in al-Ḥasan Mahdi, Adʿiyat al-Imām al-Mahdi, 84.
45. This is an important point. The Mahdi would have said, “There is no Manifestation (zuhur, implying his own), without God’s authority (or will).” Quoted in Al-Ṣadr,
Tārīkh al-Ghaybah al-Sughrá, 308. This does not prevent subjective points of view, such
as declaring that the Occultation will last as long as the Mahdi is in danger (see ibid.,
131).
46. The Mahdi’s messianic ethic clearly raises questions of political theology that
neither the bodhisattva nor the thirty-six righteous men worry over. Nor does the Book
of Mormon develop a political discourse about the Three Nephites, though it could
have, conferring on them a specific millennial role, for instance; they will judge Lehi’s
descendants, but only in quorum with the other nine (see 1 Nephi 12:10; 3 Nephi 27:27;
Mormon 3:19) since supreme power will be held by Christ exclusively. The Immortals
of Taoism are the most indifferent to political power: even if all of humanity pled with
them to govern the world, they would not condescend to burden themselves so, since
calamities never reach them! See The Book of Chuang Tzu, chapter 1.
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impose such a program by means of a violent rupture and by virtue of
his incarnating wisdom in the world.
Explanations of the Mahdi’s longevity tend to the miraculous. There
is another line of reasoning that lists a number of persons whose lives
lasted several centuries without necessarily contradicting natural law.
Yet Ibn Bābūya—who uncovers a long list of people who attained a very
advanced age, emphasizing Noah47 in an attempt to make the case of
the Mahdi banal—overlooks that these people age, which makes them
extraordinary in a different way.48
Clearly, the Mahdi does not need to wish [vœu] for excessive
longevity. The situation itself guarantees it to him for as long as he is
bound—by election and (pre-existentiell) ontological worthiness—to
his mission, which he consecrates for a testimony.49 The Shiʿites declare
that he became Imam at his father’s death, when he was not yet ten years
old. If this is so, he would have had no time to request longer life, much
less acquire merits to use in the service of his community.50

47. Ibn Bābūya, Kamāl al-dīn wa-tamām al-niʿmah, 302, 473, 482. Noah lived for
2,500 years, according to Majlesi, Bihār al-Anwār, 52:200.
48. Ibn Bābūya himself sets Khodr aside because he drank the elixir of life. See
Ibn Bābūya, Kamāl al-dīn wa-tamām al-niʿmah, 362.
49. Translator’s note: the term existentiell is paired with the term existential in
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson
(New York: Harper and Row, 1962), 33. Existentiell means the understanding we have
that comes by way of existing, though it is not necessarily a conscious understanding.
Existential describes what is characteristic of the structure of existence.
50. However, I would tighten up the hypothesis of the vow by default because
the possibility of forfeiture cannot be excluded a priori. By virtue of his transcendental
liberty, the Mahdi gives his word. If it is true that “being absolutely available to others
precludes the right to dispose freely of oneself ” and that “suicide is tied to unavailability” (Marcel, Being and Having, 124, translation modified), then were he to commit
suicide or allow himself to be killed, were he to merely think of it, the era of justice
would be so completely undone that humanity would immediately be summoned for
the last judgment. He does not need to give his word again because the power of transcendental liberty that he experiences relieves him of the capacity to revoke that word.
On this last point, see Karl Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith: An Introduction to
the Idea of Christianity (New York: Seabury, 1978), 129.
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The Bodhisattva
No, it is rather the Awakened One, the bodhisattva, who worries about
acquiring merit, as reported by a seventh-century Mahayanist writer,
Ṥāntideva, in a work of rare density: “Having completed all these rites,
and by virtue of the merit I have acquired, may I be for all beings he who
soothes their hurts!”51 In prefacing this vow by recalling his achievements,52 the bodhisattva enters into a logic of accumulation that will
allow him to transfer substantial merit from himself to others: Christ is
a storehouse of merit because of the crucifixion; the bodhisattva’s value
derives from his asceticism and his elevation. But whereas Christ blesses
humankind with the merits produced by his Passion, the bodhisattva
applies the merits earned in service toward his own enlightenment.
Both exert themselves, but the bodhisattva does so in order to be able
to share what he accumulates,53 the Christ in sharing what he has already won.54
From the moment of his conception, Christ lived for others. This is
not true of the bodhisattva, who must, first of all, recognize that a return
to himself would be feckless: “His benevolence is indefatigable because
he perceives the inexistence—the emptiness—of his self.”55 So it is that
51. Ṥāntideva, Bodhicaryāvatāra III.7 (translated from the French as quoted by
Hatem; see La Marche à la lumière, trans. L. Finot [Paris: Bossard, 1920]).
52. The Bhodisattva’s six perfections include generosity (notably in his teaching
of the law), morality (in both abstention and action), patience (in enduring injury,
etc.), energy (which must be inexhaustible in equal measure with the number of creatures in the world), concentration in meditation, and wisdom. Cf. Asaṅga, Mahāyāna-Sūtra-Saṁgraha ad. IV.9.
53. “I must acquire numerous virtues, for me and for others.” Ṥāntideva, Bodhicaryāvatāra VII.35 (translated from the French as quoted by Hatem).
54. This comparison overlooks the eucharistic dimension of the gift of self, which
can be understood as an exertion by distribution (and not only exertion for distribution), because it is not held in common among churches calling themselves Christian.
55. Translated from Carré’s French as quoted by Hatem; see Soûtra de la Liberté
inconcevable: Enseignements de Vimalakîrti, trans. P. Carré (Paris: Fayard, 2000). For
an English source, see The Holy Teaching of Vimalakīrti: A Mahāyāna Scripture, trans.
Robert A. F. Thurman (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1976),
57. One may remark an apparent divergence from the position Lévinas maintains in
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a bodhisattva mahasattva (a great being), the Compassionate One,
Avalokiteśvara (he who lowers his gaze toward the world), progressively
imbued with the aura of legend, begins his career considering as void
the five aggregates that make up the phenomenal world: forms, sensations, perceptions, mental productions, and awareness.56 Since egoism
is no longer possible, love becomes allocentric (or “other-centered”)
and totally disinterested at the same time: “If you do something in the
interest of others, there is no room for pride! no room for complacency!
no room for retribution! You must have but one passion: a passion for
the well-being of others.”57
No longer possessing a self, the bodhisattva can give away everything he has. And he need not fear death.58 Drawing heavily on psychological stratagems in establishing a foundation for the principles of
emptiness, Ṥāntideva goes as far as to invite the candidate to universal
commiseration, calling compassion the “mother of the health of all
men,”59 to convince the candidate of a shift in the limits of egoity or
even a transfer to others of his own ipseity (or “self-identity”) in such a
way that the concern for others will not run up against a commonplace
caring for self:
Why not consider as “me” the body of others? As to recognizing
our own bodies as strangers, this is an accepted idea and presents
no difficulty. In considering that one is oneself full of faults and

Otherwise Than Being, that subjectivity consists in vulnerability and exposition to others. True, he thinks subjectivity starting from the desubstantiation of the subject and
with substitution. See Emmanuel Lévinas, Otherwise Than Being, or Beyond Essence,
trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1997).
56. From the Heart Sutra.
57. Ṥāntideva, Bodhicaryāvatāra VIII.109 (translated from Finot’s French as quoted
by Hatem).
58. The Flower Ornament Scripture L.10 (translated from Hatem’s French rendering). The list of possessions from which he is disposed to give alms is impressive: it
includes his wealth, his wife and children, his limbs, head, eyes, etc. (see ibid., I.21).
59. Ṥāntideva, Bodhicaryāvatāra X.13 (translated from Finot’s French as quoted
by Hatem). Regarding the ten kinds of commiseration, see Flower Ornament Scripture
III.2.
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that others are oceans of qualities, one will apply oneself to reject
one’s own personality and adopt that of someone else. One is interested in one’s members as parts of one’s body, why not in men
as parts of humanity? From habit, we apply the idea of me to this
body without soul: why not to others? In this way, if we do good to
others, we will feel neither pride nor complacency. One does not
hope for recompense because one is nourished oneself.60

How remarkable the effect of this emptiness! Transfer of merit to
others is possible because there is, at bottom, no self. As the ego and its
artifices mount real resistance to such emptiness in the world, a coup
is necessary: the simple transfer (considering others as myself) is not
enough; I must also consider myself a stranger. (Indeed, the bodhisattva
counsels his ego to despair of all self-interest because he has sold it to
others.)61 This is a double movement that Ṥāntideva formulates as the
inversion of ego and others.62 Our reaction to the intolerable envelops
the universe and determines the virtue of humanity beyond what Mencius had conceived. What the Chinese sage deems natural—kindness—
requires, according to the Indian, transmutation by decentering the
person whose soul is engraved with a will to be only toward himself
and by reidentifying the self with others. Hence the sage’s astonishment
at the bodhisattva: “This pearl of beings, this unprecedented pearl: how
is it born since none else feels inclination, or interest, in the well-being
of others?”63 Lao-Tzu’s astonishment is more pronounced, for he holds
that a saint imitates heaven and earth by not showing benevolence
(jen) toward people, whom he considers straw dogs!64 The bodhisattva
seemed to him to contradict nature.

60. Ṥāntideva, Bodhicaryāvatāra VIII.112–16; cf. VIII.158 (translated from Finot’s
French as quoted by Hatem).
61. See ibid., VIII.170. The bodhisattva similarly renounces his body, keeping it
solely as an instrument of action (ibid., VIII.184).
62. See ibid., VIII.120.
63. Ibid., I.25 (translated from Finot’s French as quoted by Hatem).
64. Lao Tzu, Tao Te Ching, 5.
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In contrast with Christ (whose disposition in favor of the world
preceded his Incarnation), awareness comes to the bodhisattva as a
result of his awakening. Hence the necessity of a formal engagement
that raises being-for-others to the level of being-toward on the ruins of
being-for-self:
May I be the remedy for illness, the doctor, the nurse, until the
illness is extinguished! May I allay with showers of food and drink
the torments of hunger and thirst, and in times of famine, become
myself drink and nourishment. May I be for the poor an inexhaustible treasure, to be ready to render to them the services they
desire! All my future incarnations, all my possessions, all my merit
past, present, and future—I renounce them with indifference so
that the purpose of all beings might be fulfilled. Nirvana is to give
up all, and my soul aspires to nirvana. Since I must renounce all, it
is better to give it to others. I deliver this body to the good pleasure
of all beings, that without ceasing they beat, violate, and cover it
with dust! That they make of my body a toy, an object of derision
and amusement! I gave them my body, what does it matter to me?
That they make it do whatever they will! So long as I am not the
cause for harm to anyone! If their heart is inflamed and malevolent
because of me, let this too serve to realize the ends of all! That
those who slander me, harm me, mock me, with all the others,
obtain bodhi! May I be the protector of the abandoned, guide
to those who walk the path, and, for those who desire the other
shore, may I be the raft, the crossing, the bridge; may I be a light
to those who need a light, a bed to those who need a bed, the slave
of those who need a slave; may I be the miracle Stone, the Urn
abundant, the magic Formula, the plant which heals, the wishing
Tree, the Cow of desires! Just as the earth and the other elements
serve many purposes for innumerable beings spread wide in infinite space, even so may I be useful in all ways to them that occupy
that space, even if they will not be delivered for an age.65

65. Ṥāntideva, Bodhicaryāvatāra III.8–22 (translated from Finot’s French as quoted
by Hatem).
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This is quite a contrast with the ideal of buddhahood in Hīnayāna
(Lesser Vehicle) Buddhism, where the saint, now entered into nirvana,
cuts himself off from humanity, having pursued his own salvation exclusively! The bodhisattva slows his own liberation indefinitely by not
severing the lines of transmigration. In taking upon himself, by virtue
of universal compassion, the ordeals [calvaires] of other beings, and in
working to instruct and liberate them by means of the merits he has
accumulated, he shows that their deliverance, not his, is what motivates
him.66 He does not aspire to awakening, does not accumulate virtue, and
does not identify himself with the body of wisdom except for the good
of others: “For all the good deeds he performs, he expects not the least
recompense.”67 He takes the place of others for pure love, not for algophilia, the love of pain in others or himself.
The nature of the bodhisattva’s vow implies that he will be the last to
enter into nirvana at the very end of all the cycles and all the centuries
of time, if that day ever comes. His continual and eternally unchanging
presence on the earth (here the equivalent of longevity) is in no way a
source of joy, but really a pure and simple calamity freely desired.68 The
remarkable thing about the bodhisattva is that he confers this presence upon himself, which is to say by retrenchment or suspension of
extinction (and not by addition and transfiguration as for the Three
Nephites). He both makes the vow to live and assures the conditions
of its realization because on the one hand there is in Buddhism no
instance of a superior personage (God), and on the other Buddhism

66. See Ṥāntideva, Ṥikshā-Samuccaya XVI.
67. Holy Teaching of Vimalakīrti, 36 (translated from Carré’s French as quoted
by Hatem). This does not constitute a critique of the Buddha, who, identified with the
Absolute in Mahāyāna (Great Vehicle) Buddhism, would have needed a mere gesture in
order to extinguish his body and enter into nothingness. He would not cease, therefore,
to teach the law, and the length of his life is incalculable. Cf. The Saddharma-Puṇḍarīka
XVI.
68. This calamity would not serve to assure his salvation—this happened to the
sinners of ancient times according to the Book of Mormon: “And the days of the children of men were prolonged, according to the will of God, that they might repent while
in the flesh” (2 Nephi 2:21).
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allows for repeated incarnations until deliverance. This is different from
the idea we find in Goethe, where Faust becomes convinced that he is
immortal, that Nature will simply replace his present form when it can
no longer contain his spirit. Nor is the bodhisattva a natura naturans
(or “the self-creating activity of nature”) like Raphael, who, according
to Nietzsche, would never have to die.69 Rather, the bodhisattva’s vow
involves a compassion that offers itself, vowing to attend carefully to all
creatures and protect them from evil, to obtain for them an outpouring of blessings, and to work to that end endlessly, in things great and
infinitely small alike.70
This outpouring is not the grace of a God, but a surplus of messianicity via a relation to the fact of natural death as well as to the imperatives of reincarnation, which ensures the bodhisattva’s survival. If
freedom really is the way of humanity throughout time, an individual
only navigates it with a vow. “Only love possesses the talisman of eternal peace,” Novalis would say.71 Like Christ, the bodhisattva is choked
by the misery of men because of their sins. In taking the irrevocable
decision to be in agony until the very end of the world, in the manner of Pascal’s Christ, he allows the idea of a human messianicity to
achieve full flower. His life elucidates the affective foundation of human
messianicity:
The bodhisattva has a marrow-deep love for all creatures, like one
might have for an only child; his love works endlessly to keep
them safe. . . . Like a dove cherishes her little ones, remains with
and broods over them, destroying repulsion by this love; so it is
with the Compassionate in relation to all creatures, who are his
children.72
69. See Friedrich Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 100–107 (II, §8).
70. On this last point, see Jad Hatem, Charité de l’infinitésimal, variations leibniziennes [Charity of the infinitesimal: Leibnizian variations] (Paris: L’Harmattan), 2007.
71. Jochen Schulte-Sasse et al., ed., Theory as Practice: A Critical Anthology of Early
German Romantic Writings (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 129.
72. Maitreyanātha/Āryāsaṅga, Mahāyānasūtrālaṁkāra XIII.20, 22 (translated
from S. Lévy’s French as quoted by Hatem).
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For this reason, the bodhisattva ranks among the mystics of pure love
whose worth, in its excess, surpasses all limits. A logic of scale pertains:
A person who, on occasion and without real regard, makes a meager donation of food to a few of the poor, enough to support them
for only half a day, is celebrated as a saint. What to say, then, of him
who gives to an infinite number of souls, for time without end, all
that they desire, endlessly, until all living beings meet their end.73

We can say in the case of the bodhisattva that his love is excessive, but
also that his case rests on a sure foundation.
Earlier, I mentioned the notion of being-toward. This modality of
intersubjectivity acquires, in the context of messianicity, the value of
placing the self at the mercy of others. “I belong to others!” the bodhisattva tells himself. “This must be your conviction, oh my heart! Their
well-being must be your only concern from now on!”74 And from this
moment, he sees being present to others as the vector of an infinite
availability.75
Very different is the attenuated modality of the postponement
of heaven portrayed by André Schwarz-Bart in The Last of the Just.
Schwarz-Bart imagines Yeshua (Jesus considered as a righteous Jew,
no more and no less) waiting at the gates of paradise so as not to forget
humankind in favor of the Messiah, for whom he also waits.76 The attenuation of this modality is to be found in its inefficacy. While living,

73. Ṥāntideva, Bodhicaryāvatāra I.32–33 (translated from Finot’s French as quoted
by Hatem).
74. Ibid., VIII.137 (translated from Finot’s French as quoted by Hatem).
75. One might think once more of Gabriel Marcel: “I belong to you. This means: I
am opening an unlimited credit account in your name, you can do what you want with
me, I give myself to you. This does not mean, at least not in principle: I am your slave; on
the contrary, I freely put myself in your hands; the best use I can make of my freedom is
to place it in your hands; it is as though I freely substituted your freedom for my own; or
paradoxically, it is by that very substitution that I realize my freedom.” Gabriel Marcel,
Creative Fidelity, trans. Robert Rosthal (New York: Farrar, Straus, 1964), 40.
76. See André Schwarz-Bart, The Last of the Just, trans. Stephen Becker (New York:
Atheneum, 1961), 319–29.
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the just provides the offices of intercession and substitution. In dying,
however, he leaves his place to another and no longer carries on his old
mission. The Yeshua of the novelist thus does not resemble the bodhisattva, who has dedicated body and soul to all created beings. He is
content to be present to them in prayer and deprives himself of paradise
only in sympathetic expectation.77 This is neither preaching nor direct
action like that of the bodhisattva, but participation.
In The Last of the Just, then, Yeshua’s death is taken seriously and,
in consequence, so is his suffering, even without the redemptive value
assigned to it by Christians. The Muslim tradition, which holds that the
Son of Mary eludes the cross that he might be held in reserve for the
era of justice, runs counter: Issa will descend from one of the heavens
at the end of time,78 either as the Mahdi (as most Sunnis contend)79 or
as a stand-in for the Twelfth Imam (according to the Shiʿites). Like the
novelist’s Yeshua, he is both absent from the world in the flesh and yet
present to it—more so because, being yet alive, he is able to return. This
characterization makes him susceptible, in the popular (and novelistic)
imagination, to combination with other forms, like one sees in Orhan
Pamuk:
Liberation might be just around the corner; at our darkest hour,
someone might emerge to deliver us from wretchedness. A savior
who’s walked this earth before, perhaps centuries before, will come
back to life as someone else; five hundred years after his death,

77. For an idea of what Yeshua deprives himself of, see (among other delights) in
the Talmud at the Taanit treatise (31a), which imagines that the Eternal will organize a
dance for the just in paradise and that he will count himself among them. See Michael
L. Rodkinson, ed., Babylonian Talmud: Taanit 31a.
78. The pilgrims of the ascension will meet him in the second heaven, according
to Ibn ʿArabi, The Meccan Revelations, 2 vols., trans. William C. Chittick, James W.
Morris, Cyrille Chodkiewicz, and Denis Gril (New York: Pir, 2002–2004).
79. In a remark attributed to him by the Sunnis, Muhammad announces, “There
is no Mahdi but Jesus, son of Mary.” Muslim Ibn al-Hajjaj, Ṣaḥiḥ (Cairo: n.p., 1873),
2:304.
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He’ll come back to Istanbul as Mevlana Celâlettin or Sheikh Galip
or perhaps even a newspaper columnist!80

It is not clear if this passage deals with a resurrection from the dead
(which would lend itself to the change in his appearance) or a period
of latency, or more simply a lifting up (the title of qāʾim—Resurrector—being assumed by the Shiʿite Mahdi,81 he who had never been to
hades). What is clear is this: Pamuk conceives a discontinuity by which
the ravages that envelop the world may be explained.
There is, finally, a messianic vow that does not require a prolonged
mortality but does require a renouncement of paradise: the desire that
heaven give way to earth. True, the labor this entails precludes the possibility of experiencing supreme pleasure. And one is right to ask if this
vow, expressed so poignantly by Thérèse de Lisieux as she neared death,
does not in some way accord with that of the bodhisattva:
If the good Lord grants my desires, my heaven will be here on the
earth until the end of the world. Yea, I would spend my heaven
doing good on the earth. . . . When the angel will say, “Time is no
more!” then will I rest, then will I rejoice, because the number of the
elect will be whole and all will have entered into joy and into rest.82

By “heaven,” we should here understand both a duration of time and
the various graces that the Saint receives for distribution to others. This
passage implies that in order to remain present to the world, she will

80. Orhan Pamuk, The Black Book, trans. Maureen Freely (New York: Vintage,
2006), 276.
81. The same is true in Ismailism, where the term is reserved for the Imam who
substitutes his own spiritual authority for religious law. See Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, Paradise of Submission: A Medieval Treatise on Ismaili Thought, trans. S. J. Badakhchani (New
York: Tauris, 2005) §370, 418. Note that the resurrection of the dead is more precisely
sketched out by baʿth. Sijistāni, for example, who deploys two separate notions, reserves
qiyāmat for the Mahdi. Cf. Alī ibn ʿUthmān al-Jullābī al-Hujwīrī, Kashf al-maḥjūb
(Leiden: Brill, 1911).
82. Le carnet jaune [The yellow notebook], July 17, 1897; cf. the letter of July 14,
1897, to Father Adolphe Roulland.
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deprive herself of heavenly joys until she feels her task is complete. But
as it is her heaven of which she would make such charitable use, this
privation does not induce the tortures the bodhisattva declares himself
ready to submit to. Thérèse’s model is the resurrected Christ, the intercessor (see Hebrews 7:25), declaring, “And, lo, I am with you always,
even unto the end of the world” (Matthew 28:20, emphasis added). But
unlike Christ and the bodhisattva, Thérèse is not entirely in control of
the fulfillment of her vow, which must first be approved by God, who
alone possesses the supernatural means to put it to work. In addition,
she must wait to know his answer, whereas the Three Nephites have
theirs in the moment they make their request.
The vow, existentielly decisive, aims first of all to stimulate virtue
and affirm will. Gandhi is explicit on this point: “A vow is an unwavering decision and helps us to defend ourselves against temptations. . . .
All of humanity has learned, by experience, that without an unshakeable
decision, progress is not possible.”83 This is why the treatise of Ṥāntideva
is enriched by words of counsel addressed to the potential bodhisattva
(concerning the means for either destroying the passions or achieving
awakening on behalf of others),84 even though it seems to have already
framed the vow as if fidelity to it allowed the candidate to accumulate
merit and, further, was ready to ensure its effective translation.
Hence the verse “From the moment the spirit embraces the tenacious idea of delivering the limitless mass of beings, though that spirit
be sleepy or dissipated, the waves of its merits grow without ceasing,
even as infinite as space.”85 Notwithstanding this attractive optimism,

83. Mahatma Gandhi, Lettres à l’ashram [Letters to the ashram], French trans.
J. Herbert (Paris: Albin Michel, 1971), 100.
84. “Whether directly or indirectly, I should not do anything that is not for the
benefit of others. And solely for the sake of sentient beings I should dedicate everything toward awakening.” Ṥāntideva, Bodhicaryāvatāra V.101. “[I have] generated the
awakening mind through wishing all beings to be happy” (ibid., VI.80).
85. Ibid., I.18–19 (translated from Finot’s French as quoted by Hatem). It is important to note that in the Ten Stages (Daśabhūmika) Sutra (chapter 26 of Flower Ornament Scripture), the station of the vows is located in the first of ten lands, that of the
supreme joy.
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the spirit is still vulnerable to danger because of the dedication of self,
and if it were to let itself be corrupted, this might place the universal good
in peril: “Any failure of the Bodhisattva is very grave, for when he sins, it
is the well-being of all others that he destroys.”86 Hence the necessity of
vigilantly safeguarding his consciousness of the vow: “That which I have
promised, I must bring about scrupulously; for if from today I do not
work to that end, I will descend to lower and lower states.”87 The vow as
existential decision comprises an engagement (a nonnegotiable token or
security), an obligation to which one contracts oneself from the moment
of a total deployment of conscience or consciousness, and a gift of self.
This gift, far from being made all at once, requires duration, not only
because the subject himself is inscribed in time and is familiar with its
phantasmagorias, but also because the vow is meant to benefit those
who live inside history (not the eternal, in other words the everlasting,
and not in some supratemporal reality, one outside of time).88 Since it is
constant, the nature of the vow itself requires an infinite duration of time.
Until every person can become a bodhisattva—taking up the vow as
a sort of rallying cry, a call to transfiguration—the Mahdi and the Christ
will not be reproduced, nor really even imitated (except wishfully or
wistfully, as a sigh of envy). All three may be called vicars of humanity,
but the Mahdi only in the sense of being-beneath.89 The bodhisattva and
the Christ alike substitute themselves for all of humanity in the sense
of being-in-the-place-of—and for the same reason, although hardly by
the same anthropological modality. Whereas the Eternal Word, becoming flesh, assumes human nature as such and in this way becomes the
“New Adam,” leader of the multitudes, the bodhisattva suffers only the
86. Ibid., IV.8 (translated from Finot’s French as quoted by Hatem).
87. Ibid., IV.12 (translated from Finot’s French as quoted by Hatem).
88. The bodies of the benevolent ones who constitute the Eight Immortals of the
Taoist tradition, healing and helping all peoples, have not become eternal as a result
of their generosity. One among them, Zhāng Guǒ Lǎo, in fact fell into his marvelous
condition merely by chance when he accidentally drank an alchemist’s broth.
89. The Mahdi helps those faithful to him and endeavors now and then to spare
them their sufferings, but he does not take them upon himself. See Ibn Bābūya, Kamāl
al-dīn wa-tamām al-niʿmah, 198.
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liquefaction of ipseity and a displacement of the limits of virtue. Put
another way, in Christianity human fulness models itself after the divine
fulness of the second hypostasis of the Trinity; in Mahāyāna Buddhism,
hypostasis must first dissolve itself so that the “I” can become all others.
But precisely because of this emptiness, this last gesture is in everyone’s reach, while because of the divine (and indissoluble) fulness of the
Second Hypostasis, the Christian act is unique.90 The Three Nephites
naturally dwell below these figures because neither their ontological
constitution nor their vocation authorizes them to attend to humanity
except nominally, for their Messiah is already doing it effectively.
The reader will have noticed that in the cases analyzed here, the
vow never tackles the question of the impossibility of its fulfillment. In
Great Vehicle Buddhism, it is the order of the cosmos itself that is the
deciding factor. In theistic religions, it is up to God to give his assent to
the vow-as-request. The messianic existential becomes a supernatural
existential the moment that natural kindness gains this greater value
and sees itself from this moment on as having effect within the movements of Providence, the divine call duly ordaining it as of the kingdom.91 A revelation given to Joseph Smith about the Saints pronounces
accordingly, “They were set to be a light unto the world, and to be the
saviors of men” (D&C 103:9).

90. Translator’s footnote: In Trinitarian Christianity, each person of the Trinity
is a “hypostasis” of the Trinity—a manifestation of its underlying reality. The Second
Hypostasis of the Trinity is the Son.
91. For theists, the bodhisattva’s attitude might be perceived as tarnished by pride,
if pride consists of finding one’s strength only in oneself. In return, the potential accusation that he reifies himself would not hold because he does not stop to recover himself
but uses his merits to do new deeds.

2

Nistar

In the centuries that followed Christ’s appearance to the Lehite
remnant, wars multiplied, the revolt against God grew, and faith diminished such that “the Lord did take away his beloved disciples,” the
three Nephite disciples whose lives he had prolonged (Mormon 1:13;
cf. Mormon 1:16). It is important to understand that he withdrew them
from the bosom of the people who knew them, for they “did tarry in the
land until the wickedness of the people was so great that the Lord would
not suffer them to remain with the people; and whether they be upon
the face of the land no man knoweth” (Mormon 8:10). Did the Lord take
them to heaven, as he had done once before (see 3 Nephi 28:13–17)?
This would seem to be suggested by the text, but I am inclined to believe
that he was content to veil them from the eyes of the flesh. Yet even if
they were removed, they would be brought back to earth, as the Book
of Mormon also attests (see 3 Nephi 28:27–29).
The clandestineness of these Nephite pilgrims on the earth does not
keep them from their ministry, nor does it prevent some of the faithful
from meeting them.1 Both Mormon and Moroni report seeing them
and receiving instruction from them (see 3 Nephi 28:26; Mormon 8:11).
1. This is in contrast with Enoch and his brethren, of whom it is said in a revelation
given to Joseph Smith that they are a city held in reserve until the day of righteousness
(see D&C 45:11–12). Joseph Smith declared that Paul knew Enoch and was taught
by him, but this phenomenon implies an extraordinary event (of a strictly horizontal
dimension), be it the rapture of Paul or the condescension of Enoch. See Andrew F.
Ehat and Lyndon W. Cook, eds., The Words of Joseph Smith: The Contemporary Accounts
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Nevertheless, they remain hidden because they remain anonymous.
Mormon, who would have lived in the fourth century, declares, “Behold, I was about to write the names of those who were never to taste
of death, but the Lord forbade; therefore I write them not, for they are
hid from the world” (3 Nephi 28:25). Their names will not echo through
the ages, but their works will.2 The name of the Mahdi is also to remain
unspoken, such that anyone who utters it is considered miscreant;3 his
name is divulged only later.4
The Hasidic masters thought to divide the servants of righteousness in two classes: those who live discreetly among the Hasidim, and
those known of the world. The condition of the tzaddiq nistar (one of
the Lamed-Vav Tzaddiqim) would seem superior to these since, lost
within the masses, he escapes the temptation to vanity. In this way,
he resembles the malāmatī of Sufism, but is more moderate in that he
does not attract reprobation in order to disguise his holiness. Some
think it possible that the nistar is hidden even from himself so that,
since he would not be the object of special distinction, he could fulfill
his mission without giving it the least attention and without evincing
exceptional heroism—especially if that mission consisted solely of existing in truth, in the simplest things, and not in a series of dazzling acts
that would assure him wealth or consideration.5 His essential nature is
thus hidden, even from him, in a place so inscrutable as to be invisible,
entirely covered over by an accessory nature: not of the thaumaturge or
of the Nauvoo Discourses of the Prophet Joseph (Provo, UT: Religious Studies Center,
Brigham Young University, 1980), 41.
2. More precisely, the names of the three are in this list: Nephi, Jonas son of Nephi, Timothy, Mathoni, Mathonihah, Kumen, Kumenonhi, Jeremiah, Shemnon, Jonas,
Zedekiah, and Isaiah (see 3 Nephi 19:4).
3. See Ibn Bābūya, Kamāl al-dīn wa-tamām al-niʿmah (Beirut: Al-Aʿlamī, 2004),
587–88. Cf. Muhammad ibn Ibrahim al-Nuʿmānī, Kitāb al-ghaybat (Qom: n. p., 2005),
300.
4. The Mahdi bears the name of the Prophet of Islam; cf. al-Nuʿmānī, Kitāb al-ghaybat, 94, 187.
5. This would happen only in extremis, as in the Hasidic story of Rabbi Raphael
of Belz, who discovers that the nondescript Isaac Leib, whom he thought a sinner, is in
reality a perfect man, to whom the elements themselves submit.
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nonconformist, nor of the dregs of the earth, but of a perfect normality
over which the gaze of the other would skitter and slide. His is a righteousness careless of renown, a virtue mingled with common humanity.
The concealment of the Mahdi, by contrast, is peculiar and does not
tarnish his purpose.6 In the first place, he takes pains to hide himself
in order to deprive his enemies of any handhold. It is said that he sinks
underground, communicating with the faithful from there, for a time,
through the mediation of four representatives.7 It is also said that his
body remains unseen (lā yurā jismuhū), whereas he himself can observe
others,8 suggesting either a supernatural veiling or a transmutation as
needed, both of which are evoked at will in crediting stories of encounters with him who, hidden, would reside in a parallel (if not a superior)
world of the most subtle quality.
But the latter is only a hypothesis conveyed by the Shaykhi School,
and is largely dismissed by the more accepted suggestion that he is in
fact visible but unknown, living alongside us without us suspecting him.

6. The following sentence is ascribed to the First Imam: “The earth is never left
without a defense, either known by all or hidden to all.” Ibn Bābūya, Kamāl al-dīn watamām al-niʿmah, 276 (translated from Hatem’s French rendering).
7. This underground space is much like the cavern where the Seven Sleepers were
immured (become for them the image of a protective hollow), so much so that the Mahdi
remains conscious of time and does not intend, when the moment comes, to return to
its windowless and ahistorical walls in order to place his soul there (as the Sleepers do
in the Mīmar of Jacob of Sarug on the Children of Ephesus, though they are, thanks to
the mercy of a resurrecting God, merely sleeping). See also Gregory of Tours, Glory of
the Martyrs XCV. It is noteworthy that in order to justify the Mahdi’s longevity, Shiʿite
writers put forward the legend, echoed in the Qurʾan, of the Sleepers who can pass
through a kind of hibernation; cf. Abū Jaʿfar al-Tūsī, Kitāb al-ghaybat (Beirut: Muassasat
dār al-kitāb, 1988), 73. They know neither the dormition of Abimelech, which lasted
seventy years (see 4 Baruch 5:30), nor, of course, the sleep of Endymion, which will
last as long as the earth and sky. In his commentary on verse 9 of “The Cavern” surah,
the Tafsīr of Qāshānī makes of the children walled up alive the seven perfect ones who
balance the cosmos.
8. Cf. Muhammad Yaʿqūb al-Kulaynī, Usūl al-kāfī (Beirut: Dāt al-adwā, 1992),1:394,
400.
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He moves from city to city in order to avoid discovery,9 goes to Mecca
during the pilgrimage, and helps his followers when they are in difficulty.10 This tangible presence, according to Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr,
gives the Twelfth Imam advantage over all other claimants.11 However,
something in him is not concealed, something that is pointedly protected by his inglorious self-concealment: his unyielding opposition to
established power, from which he has always freed himself. The Imams
who came before him owed allegiance, in effect, to usurping caliphs,
something he would not intentionally allow himself by virtue of the
rebellion he will one day have to lead. While he waits for that day, his
portion is a splendid isolation, whether one attributes wives and progeny to him or not. Some describe him as erratic, solitary, hunted.12 Does
he not risk being denied or forgotten as a result of the shadow of an
earth that, Lamartine would say, is cast on its star?13
It is as if the two phases of the Three Nephites’ career were distributed in the two hypotheses of the Imamites. The theory of the Mahdi’s
sojourn in the imaginal world—the green isle, Qāf mountain, or better,
the Land of Nowhere (Na-kōjā-abād) in which time is of a psychic or
subtle nature (latīf)—corresponds to the removal of the Three Nephites in the face of persecution. Their terrestrial life corresponds to the
theory of the Mahdi’s existence among men, though his deportment in
our times is inscrutable (kathīf). We do know that the Three Nephites
already benefit from a transformation that shields them from their enemies: cast three times into a furnace, they suffered no harm (3 Nephi
28:21). Their basic diet was also altered. But according to the second

9. Cf. Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr, Tārīkh al-ghaybah al-sughrá (Qom: n.p., 2006),
37.
10. Cf. Hussayn al-Tabarsī al-Nūrī, Al-Najm al-thāqib fī ahwāl alimām al-hujjat
al-ghāʿib (n.p.: n.p., n.d.), 2:332.
11. Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr, Bahth hawl al-Mahdī (Qom: n.p., 1996), 55. I note
the Shaykhist theory of the men of the invisible (rijāl al-ghayb): the Mahdi’s friends
(awliyāʿ) unknown to the public.
12. Muhammad ibn Jarīr al-Tabarī, Dalāʾil al-Imāmat (Beirut: Al-aʿlamī, 1988),
285.
13. Cf. verse 105 of Lamartine’s “Hymne au Christ.”
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theory, that of being hidden in plain sight, such is not the case for the
Mahdi, who, his longevity set aside, is submitted, like the thirty-six
righteous men, to the same empirical and spatiotemporal conditions as
men made of common clay. It is not clear, for example, that the Three
Nephites endure hunger and thirst. Given that their suffering is only
moral or spiritual and can only be understood as a simple result of their
solicitude for men, it has no redemptive reach, unlike that of the Christ.14
Precisely because of his vulnerability to the conditions of mortality,
the Mahdi has protected himself by occultation since his early childhood. And those through whom he speaks apparently resent attempts
to injure him because they have him pray that those who weave traps
for him will fall into their own nets.15 Justice trumps charity from the
moment one promises to punish with absolute severity those who walk
in error and crime: a consequence of a policy of predilection that wields
condemnation. In Buddhism, it is the bodhisattva who weaves nets to
catch the beasts16 and reprobates he intends to save: “He enters all the
hells of all the universes he visits to succor the damned until he can free
them.”17 Ṥāntideva exclaims, “It is essential to do good, even to our worst
enemies.”18 Indeed, among the exceptional beings who are the object
of this study, only the bodhisattva, in his great grace, cherishes and

14. Concerning Christ’s expiatory sacrifice, Mormon doctrine largely conforms
to Christian orthodoxy (though with a particular emphasis on Gethsemane). See by
way of example 2 Nephi 2:7–9; Mosiah 3:11; 3 Nephi 11:14; Articles of Faith 1:3.
15. Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan Mahdī, Adʿiyat al-Imām al-Mahdī (Beirut: Dār
al-Murtadā, 2000), 61. The sources often insist that the Mahdi will use violence when
he reveals himself; cf. al-Nuʿmānī, Kitāb al-ghaybat, 159. Mercy will not be his strength
(ibid., 237). It is said that Allah declares that he will avenge himself through the Mahdi
for the massacre at Karbalah (ibid., 96).
16. “May all animals be free from the fear of being eaten by one another.” Ṥāntideva, Bodhicaryāvatāra X.16.
17. See The Holy Teaching of Vimalakīrti: A Mahāyāna Scripture, trans. Robert A.
F. Thurman (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1976), 70 (translated
from Carré’s French as quoted by Hatem); Ṥāntideva, Bodhicaryāvatāra, X.15 (translated
from Finot’s French as quoted by Hatem).
18. Ṥāntideva, Bodhicaryāvatāra, VI.120 (translated from Finot’s French as quoted
by Hatem).
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seeks out suffering,19 whereas the righteous men take it upon themselves
without knowing the suffering of the world.20 Far from being immune
to pain, the bodhisattva enters into the play of absolute passivity, laying
himself open, in an act of propitiation, and he delivers himself to all in
an everlasting passion.
Fear, therefore, is not the reason that the bodhisattva might conceal
himself. First of all, he does not fear death; he seeks out vexations. Second, he disguises himself only for the work of conversion, a little like the
Christian God who comes incognito into the world but with an advantage.
Unlike the Christian God, who is irreversibly tied to his human body, the
bodhisattva acquires magical powers—among them the power to show
himself as he chooses in any stage of life, as any sort of person, or in the
form of gods or things.21 Since he understands that all is spirit, he is able
to master the elements, borrow various bodies, and move through walls
so easily that it is said his work meets with no impediment.22
Is it not tempting to qualify comments about the bodhisattva’s pain,
given the miracles of which he is capable as a person who fulfills more
than his strict duty to humankind? Has he not, in the manner of the
Three Nephites, taken possession of a new body? Ought we not to have
doubts about the simply metaphorical or purely moral nature of the
sickness that Vimalakīrti professes, a sickness that prompts the Buddha
to send eight thousand Bodhisattvas, five hundred Auditors, and one
hundred thousand men and gods to enquire after his health? This is the
explanation he gives:
My sickness comes from ignorance and the thirst for existence
and it will last as long as do the sicknesses of all living beings.
Were all living beings to be free from sickness, I also would not be
sick. Why? For the bodhisattva, the world consists only of living
19. “I should indeed be solely joyful toward such suffering that dispels the harms
of all.” Ṥāntideva, Bodhicaryāvatāra VI.75.
20. Cf. André Schwarz-Bart, The Last of the Just, trans. Stephen Becker (New York:
Atheneum, 1961), 52–61.
21. Holy Teaching of Vimalakīrti, 69–72.
22. The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra 2.26; The Flower Ornament Scripture III.5.
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beings, and sickness is inherent in living in the world. Were all
living beings free of sickness, the bodhisattva also would be free
of sickness.23

It is clear that the bodhisattva Vimalakīrti’s sickness springs from two
sources: existence and vicarious substitution. But does this necessarily
mean that he offers up his body to wrongdoing only in a metaphorical
sense? After all, moral suffering rarely fails to present physically. Indeed, it is said that as soon as the bodhisattva Avalokiteshvara saw the
immense misery of creatures, his head exploded from the pain. From
the scattered fragments, nine new heads were fashioned for him by the
Buddha Amitābha.
The eschatological tension resides in homo absconditus’s way of
being, in his capacity as vestige of the Unconditioned among us (the
Bikerbenu Yahweh of the Jewish tradition). If he had been continually
manifest, a theology of presence would have prevailed over a theology
of hope (which occurs when churches are built or the Imam sits in
judgment and governance, as among the Ismaʾilis). In order to be the
inviolable figure of hope at the heart of history, the Imam puts in crisis
all political theology adapted to the world. This is what Twelver Shiʿism
realizes24 and thus refutes the Fatimid Caliphate not only on the basis
of a false lineage but equally for the simple observation that it in no
way established the reign of justice. Hence the axiom that, added to
eschatological uncertainty, leads to quietism: “Every standard raised
before that of Qaʾim belongs to a tyrant.”25 And if the Mahdi seemed
cast back to the periphery of history, it could only be as its principal
actor, not as its privileged witness. If he is not its center, it is because of

23. Holy Teaching of Vimalakīrti, 43.
24. Cf. Jad Hatem, Eléments de théologie politique [Elements of political theology]
(Paris: L’Harmattan, 2005), especially chapters 1 and 5.
25. Al-Nuʿmānī, Kitāb al-ghaybat, 115. Shaykhist Imamism teaches that it is forbidden to launch a holy war during the Occultation (cf. Muhammad Karim Khan, AlRisālat aljihādiyya). The danger of (alcoholic) drink is that which Philothée O’Neddy
(Théophile Dondey de Santeny) calls “le philtre endormeur de l’espoir,” or “the potion
which lulls hope to sleep” (from “Nécropolis,” 14).
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the ahistorical character of the situation, seeing that he is alone in both
initiating the decisive instant and introducing the novelty. It is the entire
history of salvation that is on hold, a history so little coordinated with
world history since the Occultation that the first act of the Mahdi will
be to abolish world history, not to fulfill it.
I have indicated that although the Sunnis recognize a Mahdi, they
do not identify him with the Twelfth Imam (in whose existence they
do not believe), but rather with the Son of Mary, who will—as the end
of time approaches26—return as impartial judge and vanquish the enemies of true religion. They explain his exemption from death by referring to the Qurʾan, which does not admit his crucifixion. However,
his career does not continue among human communities because the
Book specifies that Allah raised him unto himself (see 4:158). When the
Son of Mary comes, he will descend from where he resides: the second
heaven (or the fourth, according to other sources). It is the use of the
word nuzūl (descent) that indicates, according to commentators, that
Jesus lives in the supraterrestrial region.27 Indeed, if he had lived on the
earth, one commentator points out, he would have been obliged to find
Muhammad and support his cause.28 Ibn ʿArabī assigns him a particular
destiny in attributing to him the eminent title “Seal of Universal Holiness.” He conceives the existence of four pillars bodily present in the
world until the day of the resurrection: Idris, Jesus, Elijah, and Khodr.
By them, Allah preserves faith, holiness, prophecy, and mission.29 In
reality, Idris and Jesus reside in celestial spheres, but these are considered by Ibn ʿArabī as part of the cosmos. The Judeo-Christian tradition
holds that Elijah and Enoch (the Idris of Islam) have also been raised up.
26. There are Sunni texts that have Muhammad saying he was waiting for this
imminent descent; cf. Hindī, Muntakhab (Cairo: n.p., 1895), 6:55–56.
27. For an example taken from the Shiʿite tradition: Imam al-Baqir would have
said that the Son of Mary “will descend to the world (ilâ al-dunyâ) on the day of Resurrection.” Muhammad Baqir al-Majlesi, Bihār al-anwār (Beirut: al-Wafāʾ, 1983), 14:530.
28. Cf. Al-Hāfiz Abū al-Fadl al-Hasanī, ʿAqīdat ahl al-Islām fī nuzūl ʿĪsā ʿalayhi
al-salām (Beirut: ʿAlam al-kutub, 1986), 30.
29. Ibn ʿArabi, The Meccan Revelations, 2 vols., trans. William C. Chittick, James
Winston Morris, Cyrille Chodkiewicz, and Denis Gril (New York: Pir, 2002–2004).

Nistar

39

Elijah must return as a precursor of the Messiah, per Malachi 3:22–23
(see Matthew 17:10–12). The Message of La Salette30 announces that
Enoch and Elijah, “filled with the Holy Spirit, will preach with the force
of God.”31 Mormon doctrine also has it that Elijah was preserved from
death for several centuries until he had accomplished all the missions
that had been entrusted to him (see D&C 110:13).32 Enoch’s case is even
more spectacular, since not only was he raised up to God, but, according
to Mormon belief, he was raised up together with the entire city he had
built, with all its inhabitants (see Moses 7:69).
In conclusion, the Son of Mary is tangential to the paradigm of
human messianicity: although he no longer moves among people, he
plays a role in the conservation of the human world and remains present
to it, ready to appear once more. Though it does not confer upon Jesus
the position of Mahdi, one may remember that the Shiʿite doctrine
allows for his return as an auxiliary of the Twelfth Imam: a meeting of
the two hidden from men—one among them, the other in a heaven or
in a sphere of the imaginal world; a means to proceed to a convergence
and not merely a harnessing of legacy. Does the Mahdi not sometimes
resemble Jesus physically as well as morally? Is it not said that he comes
again (lahu rajʿat) after the manner of the Son of Mary?33
Katarina Frostenson pronounces: “We fell the forest and the bare
isle makes its way in the light. All our disquiet yields before the form
that appears.”34

30. Translator’s note: Hatem has reference here to an apparition of Mary in La
Salette, France, in 1846.
31. Cf. Léon Bloy, Celle qui pleure, Appendice l’apparition et le secret [She who
cries: Appendix to the apparition and the secret] (Paris: Société du Mercure de France,
1908), especially chapter 3.
32. Doctrine and Covenants 110:14 recalls the prophecy of Malachi; see also 3 Nephi
24–25.
33. Al-Majlesi, Bihār al-anwār, 52:226.
34. Katarina Frostenson, Canal, trans. Christofer Bjurström (Beuvry: Maison de
la poésie d’Amay, 1998), 131 (translated from the French).

3

Kerygma

The Three Nephites distinguish themselves from the thirty-six
righteous men and the Imam by their proselytism:1
And behold they will be among the Gentiles, and the Gentiles
shall know them not. They will also be among the Jews, and the
Jews shall know them not. And it shall come to pass, when the
Lord seeth fit in his wisdom that they shall minister unto all the
scattered tribes of Israel, and unto all nations, kindreds, tongues
and people, and shall bring out of them unto Jesus many souls, that
their desire may be fulfilled, and also because of the convincing
power of God which is in them. And they are as the angels of God,
and if they shall pray unto the Father in the name of Jesus they
can show themselves unto whatsoever man it seemeth them good.
Therefore, great and marvelous works shall be wrought by them,
before the great and coming day when all people must surely stand
before the judgment-seat of Christ; Yea even among the Gentiles
shall there be a great and marvelous work wrought by them, before
that judgment day. (3 Nephi 28:27–32)

The Book of Mormon does not establish a causal connection between
anonymity and the work of conversion. That is, the method of conversion

1. Conversion to God is key to the mission given to Joseph Smith, to whom Christ
says, “And if it so be that you should labor all your days in crying repentance unto this
people, and bring, save it be one soul unto me, how great shall be your joy with him in
the kingdom of my Father!” (D&C 18:15).
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does not seem to rest on remaining hidden, a condition that would profit
nothing but safety.
This connection, however, is explicit in the case of the bodhisattva,
who is not content merely to succor people and to be responsible for
them,2 but takes great pains to lead them to safety:
They intentionally become courtesans in order to win men over,
and, having caught them with the hook of desire, they establish
them in the Buddha-gnosis. . . . They fearlessly behold those who are
masters to be served, and they become their servants or slaves. . . .
They demonstrate all activities, whichever possibly may be a means
to make beings delight in the Dharma. . . . Having perfected an infinite wisdom, they liberate an infinitude of living beings.3

In passing into a region of shadow and illusion, the Mahdi has no
plans to convert others. We have seen that, according to one tradition,
his disappearance made the danger of apostasy weigh heavily on those
Shiʿites gnawed by impatience and doubt. Would it sift them? Could it
be the means of discovering who is a substantially authentic believer?
These questions are answered in the doctrine professed by the Fifth
Imam, who desired that the Imams and the hearts of their followers
be made of the more noble part of the firmament so that they might
yearn naturally after their Imam in contrast with their enemies, whose
hearts are drawn to an infernal substance.4 In superimposing these two
givens, the test becomes a factor in setting aside all those who will not
truly partake of the celestial substance. Inversely, potential Shiʿites turn
freely toward their Imam. In any event, the teaching attributed to Imam
Muhammad al-Bāqir cannot nourish the hope of a voluntary and universal rallying to the sacred cause.
2. “The love that is effort because it takes responsibility for all living beings.”
The Holy Teaching of Vimalakīrti: A Mahāyāna Scripture, trans. Robert A. F. Thurman
(University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1976), 57.
3. Ibid., 71–72. It is equally noteworthy that the bodhisattva goes to gaming houses
to save gamblers and to houses of pleasure to reveal the dangers of carnal desire (ibid.,
21).
4. In Muhammad Yaʿqūb al-Kulaynī, Usūl al-kāfī (Beirut: Dāt al-adwā, 1992), 2:7.
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And yet, is there not room to think that he who sustains the world
merely by his holy presence (who gives himself, therefore, to the ontological good, that which makes God prefer being to nothingness and
privilege mercy over anger)5 would necessarily develop a heart totally
and unconditionally receptive? The degree of the self-effacement of the
nistar would be in the measure of this receptivity. One may believe Katarina Frostenson: “Of myself I am nothing, but in the desert I am that
which may contain all.6

5. These two traits are equivalent for F. W. J. Schelling: it is in subordinating anger
to love that the Eternal changes the force of contraction into the foundation of a force
of expansion.
6. Katarina Frostenson, Canal, trans. Christofer Bjurström (Beuvry: Maison de la
poésie d’Amay, 1998), 123 (translated from the French).

4

Contemporaneity

If the emphasis on the postponement of heavenly glory can be
shifted from the actual supplicant to whoever imagines or thinks it
(from the Three Nephites to Joseph Smith, for example), a new concept
intervenes in the link with the original apostolate: that of contemporaneity. Not being a contemporary of the incarnate God, like the beloved
disciple (immediate contemporaneity), and instead of turning back to
a tradition that transmits the possibility of salvation (mediate contemporaneity), Smith conceives a redoubled immediate contemporaneity
that makes him the immediate contemporary of those (the apostles)
who were the immediate contemporaries of Christ moving among men.
Even if he had not mentioned a meeting with John and even though he
did not mention a meeting with the Three Nephites, the possibility of
such a meeting could not be set aside—and it remains a possibility for
everyone, even today, and a way to be in better communication with the
event than across an uncertain transmission.1 Similarly, neither Mormon nor Moroni was present during the appearance of the resurrected
Christ to the Nephites.
I hazard the hypothesis that the reason for which an encounter with
the Three Nephites holds no place in Smith’s apostolic plan2 is that he
1. Advocates of this immediate contemporaneity, redoubled or not, may put to
suspicion the apostolic (and pontifical) and Fatimid successions, as well as that of the
first Eleven legatees in Twelver Shiʿism.
2. An allusion in an article of April 1842 takes a satirical turn. Referring to certain
luminaries of the church, Smith mentions the case of a member who declared he must
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achieved still another contemporaneity, irreducible to any of the three
just mentioned—all of which might be located along the line of temporal horizontality. It was not enough for Smith to be the translator of the
Book of Mormon, however original a figure that made him. He rises to
the stature of prophet by receiving revelations directly, becoming the
direct contemporary of Christ vertically. The result is a rupture in the
line of temporal horizontality (a rupture not present in the discovery of
the Book of Mormon, seeing that it was merely buried in the earth). In
effect, it is the supratemporal that comes to meet Smith in the person of
the Father and the Son or angels. He establishes contact with the beyond
practically at will, as can be seen in his autobiography.
The paradigm of the longevity of Christ’s direct contemporary in
horizontality (John or the Three Nephites) weakens from the moment
the direct contemporary establishes himself in verticality. After the
death of their founder, the Latter-day Saints had the opportunity to
strengthen the paradigm of horizontal longevity by conceiving, for example, a system similar to that which the Mahdi put in place during
the Minor Occultation: communicating with the faithful via the intermediary of a deputy, a system that would have allowed the Three
Nephites to oversee the direction of the community. But the Latter-day
Saints preferred to follow Smith’s second inspiration in safeguarding
the gift of prophecy from one president of the church to the next, such
that direct contemporaneity in verticality is maintained until Christ’s
return. With the establishment of the church, institutional logic won out
over sporadic and anarchic shifts. In consequence, the paradigm of the
Three Nephites does not seem to have traction in Mormon doctrine. As
with the Eight Immortals of Taoism and the Mahdi,3 folklore has taken

be conducted to the Rocky Mountains by the Three Nephites, but they did not keep
the appointment. Joseph Smith, “Try the Spirits,” Times and Seasons 3 (April 1, 1842):
743–47. Michael Hicks urges caution in assigning editorial authorship during this period,
as Smith often worked in collaboration with others. See “Joseph Smith, W. W. Phelps,
and the Poetic Paraphrase of ‘The Vision,’ ” Journal of Mormon History 20 (Fall 1994): 68.
3. There are several accounts of very surprising encounters with the Mahdi in
Muhammad Bāqir al-Majlesi, Bihār al-anwār (Beirut: al-Wafāʾ, 1983), 52:159–80.
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hold4 of the accounts of people who have seen them, been taught by
them, or even been succored or healed under their care.5 It must have
seemed strange to his followers that the Prophet Joseph Smith did not
contribute, by personal testimony, to the saga of the Three Nephites.
This is why such a testimony was attributed to him later on.6
In the Midrash on Lamentations, it is said that the Messiah was
born at the same moment as the destruction of the temple,7 which is
not to say that he had already manifested himself as the Messiah. The
theory of his longevity would not easily be discarded, in support of

4. The same is true of Mormon literature. In Orson Scott Card’s novel Speaker for
the Dead, the protagonist Ender, who bears the burden of human guilt, is still young
after three thousand years, thanks to his interstellar voyages. See Card, Speaker for the
Dead (New York: Tor, 1994).
5. On these microhistories, see Hector Lee, The Three Nephites: The Substance and
Significance of the Legend in Folklore (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press,
1949); and Douglas Beardall and Jewel Beardall, About the Three Nephites (Provo, UT:
LDS Books Publications, 1992). As a case in point, it is attested that the Three appear
suddenly in a room, without passing through the door, in order to care for a gravely ill
child. The phraseology that they appear “out of nowhere” and disappear in like manner
becomes something of a refrain. To my mind, the touching story of a woman whose
husband had been sent on a mission to Germany deserves special mention. On a winter
morning, an old man knocks at her door and tells her he is hungry. Even though she is
impoverished, she gives him a loaf of bread wrapped in some colorful fabric. The man
goes away without leaving a single track in the snow. When her husband returns several
years later, she discovers the same bit of fabric in his suitcase. One Christmas evening,
when he was penniless, a stranger offered him some bread (Beardall and Beardall, About
the Three Nephites, 125–26). There are comparable accounts about the Mahdi, whose
fortuitous appearances meet the needs of the poor and the lost.
6. Cf. Bruce Dana, The Three Nephites and Other Translated Beings (Springville,
UT: Cedar Fort, 2003), 51–53. The author, though Mormon, invites both circumspection and doubt. Brigham Young, Joseph Smith’s successor as the head of the church,
announced in 1859 that some strangers would visit the members in order to shed light
on the mysteries of the faith. He said the souls of the saints would tremble on that occasion like those of the disciples on the road to Emmaus. See Journal of Discourses, 26
vols. (London: Latter-day Saints’ Book Depot, 1854–1886), 6:194–95. Even though the
Three Nephites are not explicitly mentioned, one can assume that Young spoke about
them.
7. Lamentations Rabbah 1:51.
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which one invokes the longevity of the first humans, “for life is God’s.”8
According to another tradition, he has already appeared in the soul
of Adam, suggesting that he is reincarnated in every age: in David, in
Moses, and so on.9 These traditions offer assurance that the seed of
salvation is always already planted or germinates as a kind of instantiated replica at the dismantling of the sacrificial cult such that another
modality of the divine presence is ensured. This does not make of the
Jew the contemporary of a promise but of its fulfillment; the Jew awaits
the Messiah’s appearance to the plain view and knowledge of the world.
This is a new way to conceive the already-there-and-not-yet, but it helps
us comprehend a way of crossing history. The legend that the Messiah
was born on the day of the temple’s destruction persists: scarcely born,
the winds carried him far from his mother’s breast, and he wanders
unknown from nation to nation, redemption occurring only once he
has been to all of them.10
The case of the Imam-Messiah of Druzism completes the tableau.11
The Druze teach that in order to escape persecutions, the ImamMessiah withdrew from the world nearly one thousand years ago to a
region called the Oases, the location of which is unknown, and from
which he will not return except to establish his rule. The uniqueness
of the Imam-Messiah’s case consists of the fact that to sustain the idea of
constant presence—by turns hidden and manifest—Druzism need not
imagine, as Shiʿism must, a succession of prophets and Imams because
it accepts the theory of metempsychosis.
8. Ramban (Nachmanides), Writings and Discourses, 2 vols., trans. Charles B.
Chavel (New York: Shilo, 1978), 2:668 (32).
9. Cf. Gershom G. Scholem, Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism (New York: Schocken,
1961), 278. On the reincarnations of the Messiah, son of Joseph, in the Lurianic Kabbalah,
see Hayyim Vital, Traité de la Révolution des âmes [Treatise on the revolution of souls]
(Milan, Archè, 1987), 288, 402; and Moshe Idel, Messianic Mystics (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1998), 167.
10. For Franz Rosenzweig, this means the veiling of the Jewish Messiah in Christianity as revelation spread among the pagans. See Rosenzweig’s Foi et savoir [Faith and
knowledge] (Paris: Vrin, 2001), 77.
11. Cf. Jad Hatem, Dieu en guise d’homme dans le druzisme [God in the guise of
man in Druzism] (Paris: Librarie de l’Orient, 2006).

Contemporaneity 49

The most striking fact is that he who messianically endures for so
long anchors the actual always and for all in the evental. He does not
seek to mock destiny, and seeks even less to bandy with time. Of course,
the bodhisattva’s time passes to allow the linearity of saṃsāra, the wheel
of reincarnation. The same does not apply to messianic time, which is
haunted, even besieged, by kairos, the opportune moment, engorged by
fulness and perfectly significant: qualitative, existentiell, multifaceted
time, susceptible to interruption in every instant in order to understand
the curve of a decisive turning. This distended time does not get stuck
in its own course as long as the incognito is shielded from those who
have inserted themselves, not as challengers, but as fulfillers. But such a
moment never adequately fulfills the hope and expectation dependent
upon a utopian promise to exorcise evil.
The contemporaneity of the Three Nephites cannot ignore eschatological expectation, for their duration unravels a time-for-others charged with guaranteeing the continuation of history. The future
dwells in coming. What mediates between worlds is the creative synthesis of the promise and of time (itself a combination of spirit and of
world) such that history has at its immanent center a purely human
standard-bearer.
The Mahdi is just as much a mediator, being, the texts say, the taut
cord between men and God.12 However, his temporality necessitates
some amendments. Even though he was not contemporary with the
origins of Islam, he very nearly was. This is a serviceable argument. The
Shiʿite theologian Muhammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr underlines, for example,
the advantage that the Mahdi was born near the sources of Islam—
before rising up against the values of a pernicious civilization, it was
good, for fear of contamination, that his personality be formed entirely
in other times.13 Besides an accumulation of time, his is a mentality
made more and more awkward by relation to the present: an intellectual noncurrency in good taste. But there is another consideration. It is
12. Cf. Muhammad ibn Ibrahim al-Nuʿmānī, Kitāb al-ghaybat (Qom: n. p., 2005),
37, 49.
13. Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr, Bahth hawl al-Mahdī (Qom: n.p., 1996), 88.
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accepted among the Shiʿites that the Imams were born of a light created
before the world.14 Their germ, deposited in Adam, moves through generational lines until its gradual fruition in the Twelve, who are one in
essence. What distinguishes the preexistence of the Imams from that of
other men is primarily that their ontological worthiness is superior, and
secondarily that they do not lose self-awareness in their incarnations.
The question of contemporaneity requires a change of inflection
in the case of the bodhisattva. By virtue of their reincarnations, all
creatures were always already his contemporaries. This was useful to
Gendun Gyatso, the second Dalai Lama (alternatively known in Tibetan
Buddhism as a partial incarnation of Avalokiteshavra), in founding
universal compassion. One might recall Ṥāntideva’s method appealing
to the inversion of me and others. The Dalai Lama’s trick consists of
developing in his soul a feeling of universal recognition. Remember,
he suggests, your mother and all her kindnesses and the innumerable
sacrifices to which she consented. Was she not ready to do anything and
all for you, even at the risk of public disgrace? From there he passes to
relatives and friends. Have they not of necessity been your mothers in
some other reincarnation? Must not one therefore return that love for
the extreme benevolence they have shown? The argument is equally
valid for the multitudes. Is it not right to be compassionate to them?
What to say, then, of enemies? We must think of them as blinded by
their rebirths. They do not realize that they were your mothers and
you were theirs. It is right to act in their regard as with a mother who,
suddenly taken by madness, assaults you.15 The beauty of the idea must
not conceal that it rests on a pre-Mahayanist psychology that sees that
the ego is maintained even as Ṥāntideva undermines it.
It follows from omnitemporality that the bodhisattva is hostage to
all others in that he can only be progressively delivered from time by
their entrance into nirvana. His case is aggravated by the fact that he
14. Cf. Ibn Bābūya, ʿIlal al-sharāʾiʿ wa-l-ahkām (Najaf: n.p., 1966), 135–36.
15. Text reproduced in the anthology of S. Bercholz and S. Chodzin Kohn, Pour
comprendre le Bouddhisme [Understanding Buddhism] (Paris: Laffont, 1993), chapter
14.
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remembers in every detail all of his prior existences.16 Without metempsychosis,17 the Three Nephites and the Mahdi see their commitment
passed on to the offspring of those for whom they are responsible and
whom they survive.

16. The Flower Ornament Scripture III.5.
17. Joseph Smith formally rejected belief in metempsychosis, or the transmigration of souls, during an 1835 conversation with one “Robert Mathias.” See Dean C. Jessee, Mark Ashurst-McGee, and Richard L. Jensen, eds., Journals, Volume 1: 1832–1839,
vol. 1 of the Journals series of The Joseph Smith Papers, ed. Dean C. Jessee, Ronald K.
Esplin, and Richard Lyman Bushman (Salt Lake City: Church Historian’s Press, 2008),
95. Ultra-Shiʿism accepts it. Twelver Shiʿism recognizes metemphotosis, to borrow a
clarifying term from Mohammad Ali Ami-Moezzi (The Divine Guide in Early Shiʿism:
The Sources of Esotericism in Islam, trans. David Streight [Albany, NY: SUNY, 1994],
75–77), which is to say a transmission from one Imam to another of the primordial
light, though the soul of one Imam is not the soul of another. There is certainly an
archetypal Imam, but those who appear on the world stage, although they come from
the same source, are not the same person.

5

Nephite-Mahdite Time

Because we fall short of being, we hurry toward the future, conceived as a dimension of fulfillment. It is not quite the same for the
Three Nephites, the bodhisattva, and the Mahdi inasmuch as they
would have already realized their essence had it not been for their concern for others. What is more, their temporality implies a differently
accented transcendence: time in equilibrium, certainly, as it lengthens
and weaves itself together with the time of men that goes its customary
way, but unstable as it assures the link between the present and the
Absolute (Advent or Nirvāna). If these figures anticipate something,
it is not death, but the irruption of the kingdom or perfect peace. It is
properly the time of a hidden, immanent presence (and not that of an
interim, as is the case with the Christian tradition), but which is not
merely an inflection of being-with. In effect, it is not sufficient to say
that it is because they possess the constitution to-be-with that they set
themselves apart or hide from the gazes of the malevolent as well as the
faithful. To advance being-toward and being-for, they place themselves
in a wrinkle in time with such intensity that the thread of finite life, woven into the details, is exceeded such that history allows just such a flawless human gaze—at once submerged and afloat in the flow of time—to
conform history to its eternal designs regardless of the too-small souls,1

1. “Why wear your feeble soul with plans for eternity?,” Horace’s Odes and Epodes,
trans. David Mulroy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), 111 (2.11).
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all in following its tours and detours2 (scansions of a like identity and
occasional alternation in route and return).3
What I call Nephite-Mahdite time—constituted, at the heart of the
difference between the actual and the possible, by the union in the
present of being and of before-occurring [devant-advenir]—is the controlling thread that, linking the initial and the terminal, tempers what
is dolorous, incomprehensible, or scandalous in the distension between
them. Do not the Ismaili Imams do much the same? Certainly. But
since they rearrange and occupy the front of the stage every time, for
a given moment, they do not possess that body which, Sándor Márai
would say, contains the enigma of time.4 And since they can also suspend the law of their own leader and usher in the kind of messianic
time that gives precedence to purely spiritual religion, they change the
very tenor of expectation. Now the perception of the duration of time
varies necessarily with the modifications made to expectation. There
are, therefore, several ways to forge a unity in the present of the future
and of the possible. Nephite-Mahdite time subordinates being-for to
being-beneath, such that the hidden presence becomes—to the one enduring who considers the course of the world from two points of view,
immanent and transcendent—the memory of the Unconditioned in the
circumstances of world history.5
A secret doctrine and the science of the significance of Arabic letters
(jafr) are passed from one Imam to another. But equally significant is
that the inspired Book given through Fatima is supposed to contain a
2. Translator’s note: I retain Hatem’s “tours et détours” for its playfulness. The
English tour is synonymous with journey here.
3. Corso e ricorso, in Vico’s vocabulary. A return to barbarism and apostasy (essentially equivalent terms) is frequent, according to the Book of Mormon.
4. Sándor Márai, Embers, trans. Carol Brown Janeway (New York: Vintage, 2002),
9–15.
5. Even though he shares in equal measure the memory of the Unconditioned,
the Wandering Jew, as a figure of despair, experiences it as a burden that obliges him to
nothing and of which he dreams of ridding himself. The Jew Pär Lagerkvist imagines
in The Death of Ahasuerus undoing the spell that binds him to earthly existence by
discovering that he, like the Crucified, is the victim of an inexorable god. But he has
not resolved the dilemma of knowing for what (or for whom) to live.
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complete account of future events.6 Yet this is how the Mahdi prevails in
his Occultation, keeping in his possession the long recollection of what
is, enriched by the anticipation of what will be, so well that the hope of
it, pervaded by that total knowledge that is his alone, distinguishes itself
from both the erratic or unfounded hopes common among mortals
and the despair of people bound to a present that tortures them. The
superiority of Nephite-Mahdite memory is forged in a consciousness
that transits history as both actor in and testimony of history’s permutations, turnings that depend on teaching and so suffer the vagaries of
transmission or the discordant deformations to which the tradition is
subjected by short-sighted individuals. In his Preface to the Treatise on
Vacuum, Pascal, heralding the progress of science made by a “succession of men,” considers “all the sequence of men over the course of the
centuries . . . as one man who lives always and learns continually.”7 But
Nephite-Mahdite time makes of humanity a man always having the first
source present to his spirit.
One, then, is the time of the Messiah who appears suddenly in human
time to entirely change its aspect. Another is messianic time that remains
drawn out to this moment. And finally there is Nephite-Mahdite time,
which introduces into the pulsation of human time a presence that endures
and witnesses, the presence of a human being laboring and struggling,
and not the presence of an institution, were it divinely established, or of
a people, had it been set apart for the sanctification of the Holy Name.
The differences are intrinsic.
Messianic time folds history in two: into the world (or age) of the
here and now (ʿolam hazeh) and the world that comes (ʿolam haba).8
6. Cf. Muhammad Yaʿqūb al-Kulaynī, Usūl al-kāfī (Beirut: Dāt al-adwā, 1992),
1:298; Muhammad ibn Jarīr al-Tabarī, Dalāʾil al-Imāmat (Beirut: Al-aʿlamī, 1988), 30.
7. Blaise Pascal, Thoughts, Letters, and Minor Works (New York: Cosimo, 2007),
449.
8. Cf. Gérard Bensussan, Le Temps messianique: Temps historique et tempe vécu
[Messianic time: Historical time and lived time] (Paris: Vrin, 2001), 8, 52–53. “The fold
fractures the linear uniformity in what-there-is and what-comes. This stratification
criss-crosses succession and superposition, contemporaneity and hope, instantaneity
and patience. The fold constitutes an internal structuration of historical time, be it a
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Nephite-Mahdite time knows and assumes the latter, but it offers its
supplemental particularity to fold in two the world of the here and now—
manifest and hidden.
What is the advantage of sempiternity? One gathers from various
Imams that, since (and even before) Adam came to light, Allah has not
left the earth without an Imam upon it—a condition for the Allah’s worship-worthiness.9 In contrast with the People of the Cave, who no longer
count the nights,10 those who are engaged with the care of the world keep
watch and know. Rapture is not their concern. Such a figure hardly raises
himself beyond the firmament when the world opens to his depths. Its
thread must be preserved by coupling memory and hope, as does Orson
Scott Card’s Fiimma: “She sang to them as if she were as ancient as the
Earth, as if all the pain of millennia of humanity had passed through her,
leaving her scarred but whole, leaving her wise but hopeful.”11
Since Mormon doctrine professes an extended period of apostasy
running from the fifth to the nineteenth century, it would seem that
God neglected humanity for an age. Thanks to the theory of the Three
Nephites, that doctrine can redeem and justify itself in light of the teaching of President Joseph Fielding Smith. For since the beginning of and
even during the apostasy, there was always someone in the sublunary
region endowed with the priesthood to stand against Satan.12 Therefore,
Nephite-Mahdite time not only allows this person to tower over history,
it also defines itself as a polemic. Its fold is that of opposition.

mobile and invisible disjunction: one never knows on which today the event folds itself ”
(translated from ibid., 158).
9. Ibn Bābūya, Kamāl al-dīn wa-tamām al-niʿmah (Beirut: Al-Aʿlamī, 2004), 199;
“before, during, and after creation” (translated from ibid., 212). Cf. Muhammad Baqir
al-Majlesi, Bihār al-anwār (Beirut: al-Wafāʾ, 1983), 52.92.
10. Cf. ʿAbd al-Karīm ibn Hawāzin al-Qushayrī, Laṭāʾif al-ishārāt, 6 vols., ed.
Ibrāhīm Basyūnī (Cairo: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī li’l-Ṭibāʿa wa’l Nashr, 1968), ad. 18:25.
11. Orson Scott Card, Songmaster (New York: Tor, 2002), 298.
12. Cf. Harold B. Lee, Stand Ye in Holy Places: Selected Sermons and Writings (Salt
Lake City: Deseret Book, 1975), 161–62.

6

Lehi’s Axiom

What I call Lehi’s axiom is the first sentence and its corollaries in the
following passage from the Book of Mormon: “It must needs be, that
there is an opposition in all things. If [it were] not so . . . , righteousness
could not be brought to pass, neither wickedness, neither holiness nor
misery, neither good nor bad. Wherefore, all things must needs be a
compound in one” (2 Nephi 2:11). It is by reason of this dynamizing
opposition—a factor of the human liberty that acts only according to
motives—that the Lord planted the two trees in Eden (see 2 Nephi
2:15–16). Thence, needless to say, proceeds the need for a devil. The
prophet presents this deduction as his own: “And I, Lehi, according to
the things which I have read, must needs suppose that an angel of God,
according to that which is written, had fallen from heaven; wherefore,
he became a devil, having sought that which was evil before God. And
because he had fallen from heaven, and had become miserable forever,
he sought also the misery of all mankind” (2 Nephi 2:17–18). The axiom
is introduced as part of a reflection on the problem of retribution, joy,
and punishment being equally necessary so that both law and creation
might be (see 2 Nephi 2:10, 13).
On the basis of this axiom, Mormon author Bruce Dana seeks to
corroborate the testimony of his coreligionist David Patten (one of
Smith’s first apostles; he died in 1838), who claimed to have twice encountered Cain, he who was condemned to wander for all time (although Mormon scripture itself barely supports such a theory). Just as
the devil sets himself in opposition to the angel so that man’s freedom
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is solidified by his being capable of good and evil, Cain will set himself
head-on against John and the Three Nephites. His work—the work of
him who forged an alliance with Satan (see Moses 5:30–31)—will be to
consume souls, just as it will be John’s work and the work of the Three
Nephites to save them.1 It is not enough to affirm, with Saint Augustine, that Cain is the founder of the earthly city.2 Here, Cain has always
accompanied Satan, seeking out those they might devour. The faculty
of memory serves evil principles as well as good.
This allows me in turn to deduce that Nephite-Mahdite time itself is
caught up in the schema of opposition, with or without the hypothesis
of an anti–Three Nephites like Cain who would reproduce in human
time the centuries-old antagonism between angels and demons—a conflict that becomes in Buddhism that of the Buddha (and the bodhisattvas) with Mara. The Mahdi must also conduct a decisive battle against
the Dajjāl, the prince of lies, whom either the Mahdi or Jesus will slay.3
Not surprisingly, this essential adversary who arises in the eschatological era is a man who must live through the ages, an idea from which
Ibn Bābūya takes his argument in order to explain the longevity of the
Mahdi.4 The adversary is identified with a certain Ibn Sāid (or Sayyād),
who would have been a contemporary of Muhammad. The Dajjāl Messiah is widely understood to be the antagonist of the Messiah, son of
Mary, in the Sunni tradition. The Dajjāl is, incidentally, seen in Jesus’s
wake in a dream of Muhammad.5 Was he Jesus’s shadow? A double? The

1. Bruce E. Dana, The Three Nephites and Other Translated Beings (Springville, UT:
Cedar Fort, 2003), 108.
2. Augustine, City of God XV.1.
3. For an argument that Jesus will kill the Dajjāl, see Al-Asfahānī, Muʿjam almalāhim wa-l-fitan (Tehran: n. p., 2002), 1:208, 228, 237–38. For arguments that it will
be the Mahdi who slays the Dajjāl, see Ibn Bābūya, Kamāl al-dīn wa-tamām al-niʿmah
(Beirut: Al-Aʿlamī, 2004), 477; and Muhammad Baqir Majlesi, Bihār al-anwār (Beirut:
Al-Wafāʾ, 1983), 52:194. For a suggestion that he will die by crucifixion, see ibid., 276.
4. Ibn Bābūya, Kamāl al-dīn wa-tamām al-niʿmah, 480–81.
5. See Ṣaḥih
̄ ̣ al-Bukhārī: The Translation of the Meanings of Ṣaḥiḥ al-Bukhari (Riyadh: Darussalam, 1997), 60:48.
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nocturnal element compounded in Jesus? In any case, this explains why
he is made out to belong to the Jewish nation.6
Regarding his distinctive physical traits, one gathers that the Dajjāl
is blind in one eye; among his powers is magic.7 As for his morality, he
is guilty of pride and deception, for he sought to pass himself off as a
messenger of Allah and still proclaimed his own divinity.8 He was a familiar of Muhammad, who saw through him in the daylight and asked
Allah to take him away. He was therefore relegated to an island9 until
the hour of his eschatological reign, which will last forty years.10 Here
the application of Lehi’s axiom is applied to astonishing effect: the need
for equal, opposing forces ensures the progressive emergence of the idea
that in response to the Mahdi’s hidden physical presence another like
presence must emerge. It is not enough, therefore, that an eschatological
war against Sufiānī (whose name evokes the sworn enemy of Ali, the
First Imam) summarizes every political conflict; what is needed is a
centuries-long confrontation, however secret, in which two incarnate
principles clash: good and evil.
Lehi’s axiom is not unlike the theory of the Fifth Imam evoked
above, according to which the faithful issue from a celestial substance,
and thus infidels must stem from an infernal one. This radicalizes the
antagonism between the two as if the infernal were a cause rather than
an effect. A second dualism is created, as in the thought of Nasīr alDīn Tūsī, who sets in opposition to each other the followers of truth
(muḥiqqān) and the followers of falsehood (mubṭilān).11

6. Al-Asfahānī, Muʿjam al-malāhim wa-l-fitan, 2:197.
7. Ibid., 2:208, 220. Here is a humorous detail: men were obliged to truss up their
wives, daughters, and mothers in order to prevent them from following the Dajjāl (ibid.,
2:231).
8. Ibid., 2:199, 205.
9. Ibid., 2:215. In this version, encountering him is possible if lost sailors wash up
on his island (ibid., 2:214).
10. Ibid., 2:215.
11. Cf. Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, Paradise of Submission §238. Note that this work is
Ismaili.
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There is still a path that leads to an ultimate profundity. The Tales
of Alvin Maker, a series by Mormon novelist Orson Scott Card, gives
this path a literary expression. He with whom Alvin, the character who
embodies messianicity, must essentially cross swords is not the Devil as
principle of moral evil but the enemy of all life, the Unmaker (or Uncreator, who is Non-doing and Non-being).12 The Unmaker is a principle of
ontological evil: that is to say, the power that can annihilate everything,
dreaming of “undo[ing] the universe, break[ing] it all down until everything is flat and cold and smooth and dead”13—which is not true of
the Devil, inasmuch as he cannot annihilate himself. In fact, the latter,
like every man who destroys,14 assists the former, but he does so without
knowing it. The Devil would sooner ally himself with God than with the
Unmaker in the great war.15 But in this conflict, one does not see that
evil involuntarily serves good, as Goethe’s Mephistopheles must confess. The work of the Unmaker promotes no construction: “They always
thought that Destruction was merely destruction, they were using it and
when they were done with it, they’d set to building. But you don’t build
on a foundation of destruction. That’s the dark secret of the Unmaker.”16
Do we not run the risk here of letting these moments confront each
other abstractly in an external relation? Put another way, do we not run
the risk of failing to consider them as moments of life, which welcomes
disjunction only when it serves the purposes of progress? It is the second corollary of Lehi’s axiom that invites an admission of an internal
link between the Unmaker and the Maker. Only in The Crystal City (volume 6 in the Tales) does Alvin imagine, without yet accepting it, that

12. Orson Scott Card, Prentice Alvin (New York: Tor, 1989), 96–98. The Unmaker
corresponds in my thinking to Mephistopheles. Cf. Jad Hatem, Satan, monothéiste
absolu selon Goethe et Hallâj [Satan: Absolute monotheist according to Goethe and
Hallāj] (Paris: Éditions du Cygne, 2006). Alvin was the name of Joseph Smith’s eldest
brother (cf. D&C 137:5). Incidentally, Card’s magical hero is a figuration of the Mormon
Prophet and his successor.
13. Card, Prentice Alvin, 100.
14. Ibid., 97.
15. Orson Scott Card, Seventh Son (New York: Tor, 1987), 128.
16. Orson Scott Card, Alvin Journeyman (New York: Tor, 1996), 230–31.
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destruction might play a role in construction, both belonging to “the
same great flow of nature.”17 That seems to contradict the law evoked
throughout Card’s Tales according to which destruction advances faster
than construction because, the deficit widening in favor of destruction,
nothingness seems certain to extend its empire. And yet it does not, if
one considers that the Maker does not face the Unmaker alone. The
victory will finally belong to building up, thanks to the infinitesimal
contributions of each: “And after a while, you come to realize that all
those somethings, they add up to everything, and all the Unmaker’s
nothings, you put them all together and they’re still nothing.”18
Like the bodhisattva, Alvin, who “thinks he can save everybody,”19
formulates a double vow: never to use his powers for personal gain20
and to consecrate his entire life to the good of others, even if it be to
construct and reinforce a reality in the face of the Unmaker’s project of
annihilation.21 This certainly implicates the prohibition on killing,22 a
moral passivity, but also the obligation to fight. “Biggest of all [obligations is] to serve all men, and all lands,” exclaims the red prophet LollaWossiky,23 a kind of shaman of nonviolence. Yet it is well understood
that service requires confrontation.24
According to the first corollary of the axiom, the whole field of
morality is polarized in the sense of a reciprocal dependence: without
sin, we can do no good (see 2 Nephi 2:23). This corollary recalls the
17. Orson Scott Card, The Crystal City (New York: Tor, 2003), 221.
18. Ibid., 378–79. This notion is inscribed in an enumeration of acts that fall under
ontology: building a family, a farm, etc. But ethics can be anchored there. Card says
of the Unmaker that he “couldn’t understand what Alvin was relying on: the power of
decent men to act against their own interest in order to help those who trusted them.”
Orson Scott Card, Heartfire (New York: Tor, 1998), 248.
19. Card, Heartfire, 142.
20. Card, Seventh Son, 64.
21. Ibid., 166–67.
22. Orson Scott Card, Red Prophet (New York: Tor, 1988), 133.
23. Ibid., 185 (translator’s addition).
24. Remarkably, the novel produces a wandering Jew—the condemned assassin
Harrison—condemned to see his existence indefinitely prolonged without being able
to shorten his days, so that he might tell and atone for his crimes.
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fundamental law of opposition developed by the philosopher F. W. J.
Schelling, which stipulates that no being can reveal itself except in its
contrary: love in hate, unity in conflict, identity in difference.25 Let us
accord to this revelation an equally practical sense: one does not do
good except in fighting evil; inversely, evil seeks to wound good.26 As
Joseph Smith puts it: “Wherever light shone, it stirred up darkness,”27
which rings true, despite the paradox.
Because of the principle of sufficient reason (which wills that nothing be done without sufficient reason to determine why such a thing
is rather than is not, and why it is the way it is and not another), this
polarity cannot simply be a fact of nature; it responds to a finality. It
was, in fact, decided on by God so as to galvanize human liberty (see
2 Nephi 2:15–16).28 The first corollary does not offer an opinion on the
substantial origin of opposition, which could only have been formally
set down. Here we need the second corollary, which conceives a scission
according to the principle of a vital activation by means of an internal
contradiction (the yin and yang, for example, each containing the germ of
the other). A compound in one is in principle susceptible to division and
evolution, the core principle both of consciousness and life in romantic
philosophy. So Schelling, tersely, asserts: “Without opposition no life,
for man as for every existence in general.”29 Lehi seems to confirm this
philosophy when he clarifies that “all things must needs be a compound
in one; wherefore, if it should be one body it must needs remain as dead,
25. F. W. J. Schelling, Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom, trans. Jeff Love and Johannes Schmidt (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2000), 41, 129,
148.
26. Cf. Jad Hatem, L’Echarde du mal dans la chair de Dieu [The splinter of evil in
God’s flesh] (Paris: Cariscript, 1987), chapter 3, section 24.
27. Andrew F. Ehat and Lyndon W. Cook, eds., The Words of Joseph Smith: The
Contemporary Accounts of the Nauvoo Discourses of the Prophet Joseph (Provo, UT:
Religious Studies Center, Brigham Young University, 1980), 253.
28. This is echoed in a revelation attributed to Joseph Smith in September 1830:
“And it must needs be that the devil should tempt the children of men, or they could
not be agents unto themselves; for if they never should have bitter they could not know
the sweet” (D&C 29:39).
29. Schelling, Sämmtliche Werke, 14 vols. (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1856–1861), 7:435.
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having no life neither death, nor corruption nor incorruption, happiness
nor misery, neither sense nor insensibility” (2 Nephi 2:11).
Through the emergence of divergent forces from an essential duplicity, the possibility of one overcoming the other is offered (which
defines the power of good and evil). This dialectic may be explained as
a case of a larger process: the overcoming of divergence itself. Schelling
is careful to note that Nature hates division because division compels
her to activity (whereas Nature aspires only to rest) and that she acts
only to free herself of the obligation to act. But there attaches to her
a fatality that her activity merely manages to revitalize the process of
division: “The opposites must forever shun, in order forever to seek
each other; and forever seek, in order never to find each other; it is only
in this contradiction that the ground of all the activity of Nature lies.”30
There remains to ask what the extension of the second corollary
is. To be universal in its reach (“in all things”), does it envelop a reality
superior to the angelic sphere? Might God be at once the Maker and the
Unmaker, the Yea and the Nay? The Book of Mormon does not permit
a judgment in favor of this supposition because all through 2 Nephi 2,
God is completely distinguished from things (about which it is said
that they comprise an opposition). However, a theological innovation
of Joseph Smith more than a decade after the publication of the Book of
Mormon invites us to submit divinity to the axiom and perhaps even to
the second corollary. Whatever sense one is right to attribute to the later
maxim, according to which God was not God for all eternity but at one
time was a man like us,31 it seems subject to the axiom and also to the
corollary insofar as humanity, according to Smith, is the best place to
progress, to pass “from grace to grace.” This, the evidence suggests, we
cannot do without overcoming and thus without the opposition comprised therein. All that becomes is always composed of and presupposes
conflict, declared Aristotle.32 But it is well understood, according to the
30.
Keith
31.
32.

F. W. J. Schelling, First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature, trans.
R. Peterson (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2004), 231.
Ehat and Cook, Words of Joseph Smith, 357.
See Aristotle, Physics 1.7 (189b30–191a23).
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fundamental Schellingian law of opposition, that such becoming is accomplished as revelation. This is why Smith lets himself hope that one of
his enemies, whom he qualifies as an adversary of truth, “will continue
to stir up the sink of iniquity, that people may the more readily discern
between the righteous and the wicked.”33 It seems that the imperative
that adorns the axiom—“there must needs be . . .”—emanates from life
itself: the lives of men, and the life of God; life that borrows its unique
voice from the poetess:
Hear how
I open myself
I am in every light.34

33. Joseph Smith Jr., “To the Elders of the Church of the Latter Day Saints,” Messenger and Advocate (December 1835): 227.
34. Katarina Frostenson, Canal, trans. Christofer Bjurström (Beuvry: Maison de
la poésie d’Amay, 1998), 73 (translated from the French).

By Way of Conclusion

A distance between the mystical and a religious messianic ethic
aims to affirm the pure love one bears for God by postponing the blessedness envisaged eventually by the former. It is reported that when
Christ asked John of the Cross what he desired in thanks for his service,
the Saint replied, “Sufferings to be borne for Thy sake, and that I may
be despised and counted as nothing.”1 One will note as well that messianicity is powerless to cover by itself the whole ethical field.
In the messianic ethic, being before men (coram hominibus) throws
aside being-before-self (coram meipso) and being-before-the-world (coram mundi), and it is only if it has its place in a theistic religion that
it doubles itself in being-before-God (coram Deo). But in exclusively
occupying the center, being-before-men determines itself as being-formen that ends in total self-sacrifice. One cannot hope to save one’s place
except by making the Unconditioned the standard by which to measure
one’s solicitude and philanthropy. It is only then that one will be able to
adopt Goethe’s proposition according to which “all conflict is eternal
rest in God the Lord.”2
The model of intelligibility I have attempted to elaborate across
the discordances between the doctrines I have examined3 inscribes in

1. Father Bruno of Jesus-Mary, St. John of the Cross, ed. Benedict Zimmerman
(London: Sheed and Ward, 1932), xiv. John of the Cross was a sixteenth-century Spanish
mystic.
2. J. W. von Goethe, Selected Verse, trans. David Luke (New York: Penguin, 1964),
280.
3. One can approach the idea of a messianic existential by means of theology. So it
is that al-Ṣadr points out that the idea of the Mahdi is both older and further-reaching
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history an immanent finality that, in order to fulfill the unfulfilled, takes
human form. In this model, transcendence is not excluded, even for
the bodhisattva. Immanence itself obeys a metahistorical tropism. It
is not in this horizon that one pays the price to carry out the complete
secularization of messianism. There is nothing particularly miraculous
about human benevolence (though kindness is in itself excessive), but
such benevolence does require a miracle—specifically, indefinite longevity—if it is to quench its vigilant passion while lodged in the heart
of time. It is in the measure to which he is immeasurably free that the
bodhisattva saves all others.4

than Islam, even if this particular religion expresses it better than all the others. Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr, Bahth hawl al-Mahdī (Qom: n.p., 1996), 55.
4. The Flower Ornament Scripture II.6.
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The Fundamental Law of Opposition:
Lehi and Schelling
§ 1. Argument
In the chapter on evil (Böse, not Übel) of his work The Theological
Foundations of the Mormon Religion, Sterling McMurrin considers what
I have called Lehi’s axiom, according to which there must necessarily
be an opposition in all things (see 2 Nephi 2:11).1 McMurrin offers two
interpretations of the axiom. According to a first approach, evil exists
to make good possible, which implies both that God creates or allows
evil in the service of a greater good and that it is necessary to experience
evil in order to appreciate the value of good (the latter of which implications McMurrin considers inappropriate). McMurrin prefers a second
approach. Rather than stipulating that opposition must exist purposively,
McMurrin is content to observe that opposition exists as a matter of
fact, inevitably. Such a description would be confirmed by dialectical
metaphysics (McMurrin mentions Taoism, Heraclitus, Hegel, and Marx)
and cooperates with a theodicy founded on a reduction of God’s power
(God would not, under this option, have to produce or to allow evil).
I intend in this essay to defend a schema that combines the first
option—interpreting Lehi’s words in terms of the purposive existence
1. Sterling M. McMurrin, The Theological Foundations of the Mormon Religion
(Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1965), 97–98. Translator’s note: Böse and Übel
are German terms. They are different in the way that “evil” and “bad” are different in
English. All Böse (evil) is Übel (bad), but not necessarily the reverse.
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of evil—with a theme that belongs to the second option: the reduction
of God’s power, which guarantees his innocence. I exclude the idea that
evil exists as a matter of fact. I do not agree with McMurrin that Hegel
and Marx believed that evil inevitably exists, but I will not deal with
such considerations here. My purpose is to implement Lehi’s axiom,
without removing it from its Mormon context, into a dynamic theodicy like that of F. W. J. Schelling. I have already—in chapter 6 of this
book—linked Lehi’s axiom with Schelling’s fundamental law of opposition. Here I would like to compare Mormon theology with Schelling’s
Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom of 1809,
where the law appears for the first time, so that I may draw the limits of
the field where implementation would be justified. I will use the words
axiom and law in order to distinguish formally Lehi’s and Schelling’s
respective formulations.
I will start at the periphery, moving step by step toward the center, where
I place the axiom and the law. I will then proceed with a comparison.

§ 2. Doctrinal Background
Mormon theology shares with Schelling’s Investigations the latter’s
nonconformity with Christian orthodoxy. To whatever extent he was
influenced by Luther, Schelling’s conception of the nature of God and
of his relationship with the world lies outside the frame drawn by Christianity. There is in Schelling no question of an Immanent Trinity since
the Word is generated in view of the creation. Further, God is bestowed
with a materiality in that his reason for being, rather than a simple
notion (as in Leibniz), is consistent with a dynamic and desiring entity
that will offer the universe its raw material. Finally, Schelling’s God
does not stand beyond time; he is becoming. These propositions are
sufficient motives for comparison. Mormon theology, too, substitutes
tritheism (or at least tritheism) for trinitarianism2 and holds that God

2. See Orson Pratt, The Essential Orson Pratt, ed. David J. Whittaker (Salt Lake
City: Signature Books, 1991), 380.
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(or the gods)3 is endowed with materiality and temporality. The Natürphilosophie that Schelling developed beginning in 1797 is all about acknowledging the consistency of the real as a foundation for the ideal.
And Schelling’s innovation in the Investigations is to think about God
as both intratemporal and becoming. One can also say that Schelling’s
God is not simple since he is compounded with his “ground,” which
guarantees the personality “only” in which “is there life.”4 According to
a well-known teaching of Mormon theology, God is composed of parts.5
The fact that God is not impassive and has human behaviors does
not trouble either doctrine. Schelling claims a consequent anthropomorphism.6 Mormon theology holds that God has a human form in the
image of which man was created (see Ether 3:16) and even, according to
a teaching traceable to Joseph Smith but not universally accepted, that
he is himself of human origin.7 Of the countless implications following
from the idea of God’s humanity, I will reflect merely that the connection between man and God is more than analogy: it is identity of structure, with a difference owed to God’s own transformation. Joseph Smith
accepts as literal the biblical assertion that Adam was created in God’s
3. Abraham 4:1 passes in a single sentence from singular—“the Lord”—to plural—
“and they, that is the Gods.”
4. F. W. J. Schelling, Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom, trans. Jeff Love and Johannes Schmidt (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2006), 75. “God,”
says Schelling, “is the absolute unity of nature and personality.” F. W. J. Schelling, Philosophische Entwürfe und Tagebücher 1846: Philosophie der Mythologie und reinrationale
Philosophie (Hamburg: Meiner, 1998), 46.
5. See James E. Talmage, Articles of Faith (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book, 1982), 48;
Pratt, Essential Orson Pratt, 79.
6. See Jad Hatem, De l’Absolu à Dieu [From the absolute to God] (Paris: Cariscript,
1987), chapter 2.
7. “God himself was once as we are now, and is an exalted man.” Joseph Smith Jr.,
History of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, ed. B. H. Roberts, 7 vols., 2nd
ed. (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book, 1978), 6:305; from a discourse given by Joseph Smith
on April 7, 1844, in Nauvoo, Illinois; reported by Wilford Woodruff, Willard Richards,
Thomas Bullock, and William Clayton. Original transcriptions can be found in Andrew F. Ehat and Lyndon W. Cook, eds., The Words of Joseph Smith: The Contemporary
Accounts of the Nauvoo Discourses of the Prophet Joseph (Provo, UT: Religious Studies
Center, Brigham Young University, 1980), 340–62.

70 Appendix 1

image. Unlike Druzism, Nuṣayrism, and even Orthodox Christianity, all
of which require God to borrow human form in order to show himself
to human beings (illusorily in the first two, actually in the third), Joseph
Smith has no need for these expedients of religion, because even if
Mormon theology allows for the Incarnation, it preserves God’s power
to manifest in human form independently of terrestrial flesh, since that
form is proper to him. Thus it is that the Father appears to Joseph Smith.
Points of convergence with Schelling are as follows: man is ipseity
and matter, like God. Both being spirit, they are solely distinguishable
by the fact that the link between universal will and particular will is
breakable in man—the condition for the possibility of evil—but is not
so in God. They share a structure, then, but only in general, because
there is one decisive difference: whereas Schelling’s Absolute becomes
progressively human, the Mormon God emerges from humanity.
Although I have used the word creation and will continue to do so,
it is clear that Mormon theology and Schelling both disqualify an ex
nihilo creation, which impacts the problem of theodicy since God cannot be held entirely responsible for what is or appears to be. Creation
is, rather, a formation from a preexistent reality, totally distinct from
the Demiurge according to Mormon theology and relatively distinct
according to Schelling.
When it comes to the notion of being Almighty, things are more
delicate, positions less certain. A knowledgeable Mormon like James E.
Talmage can, based on the doctrine he holds and defends, affirm God’s
omnipotence.8 However, McMurrin has a different opinion, demonstrable at once by his insistence that the Mormon God (who does not
operate ex nihilo)9 is not absolute, his further insistence that man’s free
will is assured, and finally by his analysis of the problem of theodicy,
which deserves quotation here:
Clearly the three concepts of the absolute goodness of God, the
absoluteness of his power, and the positive reality of evil are not

8. See Talmage, Articles of Faith, 44.
9. McMurrin, Theological Foundations of the Mormon Religion, 27.
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mutually compatible as ingredients of a theistic world view. One
of them must be compromised to save the other two. No cultured
religion can sacrifice the first; traditional orthodox Christianity
has at times lived with inconsistency and at other times hesitantly
sacrificed the third; Mormonism, liberal Protestantism, and some
philosophical theology have sacrificed the second.10

We ought to agree with McMurrin, who does not ignore Mormon
theologians’ and preachers’ uses of the rhetoric of divine omnipotence
but still holds that doctrine to be incompatible with the essence of
Mormon theology.11 Schelling’s God is no less limited in his power. Although he uses for creation a material cause of which he is not the absolute master, he has not taken it out of nothingness, and he uses mankind
(the good and the less good) to pursue the work of his own revelation.
Hence the extraordinary lines: “Man stands on the threshold; whatever
he chooses, it will be his act: but he cannot remain undecided because
God must necessarily reveal himself and because nothing at all can
remain ambiguous in creation.”12
Among cases of divergence, ought we to mention pantheism? This
seems obvious, insofar as Schelling claims he is a pantheist indeed,
whereas according to Mormon theology the things that constitute the
world are not modes of God. But besides the fact that this Spinozist
characterization of pantheism, to which McMurrin assents,13 is far from
covering all forms of pantheism (it is certainly not that to which Schelling subscribes), the fact that the Mormon God is composed of matter
(however subtle) leads, if not to pantheism as such, at least to a monist
thesis—as in a universe that is substantially one—with the result that,
however one might claim that the Mormon God is transcendent,14 he is
10. Ibid., 105.
11. Ibid., 35. In his note about divine omnipotence in Daniel H. Ludlow, ed., Encyclopedia of Mormonism, 4 vols. (Macmillan: New York, 1992), David Paulsen specifies
that this notion should not be taken in its traditional meaning of unlimited power, a
contradictory concept.
12. Schelling, Philosophical Investigations, 41.
13. McMurrin, Theological Foundations of the Mormon Religion, 102.
14. Ibid., 9.
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still made of the same substance as the rest of the universe. This is not
obvious for Schelling. But then, McMurrin is totally mistaken when he
brings together what he calls the transcendentality of Mormonism with
Calvinism rather than with Lutheranism, which would rather agree with
immanence. He ought, in fact, to have considered pagan theology, insofar
as it (with the exception of neo-Platonism) conceives divinity (plural
and singular) as intra-cosmic. At any rate, the rift between Mormon
theology and Schelling’s philosophy would not run between transcendence and immanence, but rather between monism (where God is part
of everything) and theomonism (where God is everything).15 We must
specify that there are as many pantheisms as there are monisms. Some
are reductive (spiritualist or materialist, for instance). Monism ought,
in my opinion, to define the Mormon ontology that contains plurality.
However, God’s transcendence being relative, that ontology does not
contradict Lévinas’s definition of paganism as the “radical impotence
to exit from the world. It does not consist in denying spirits and gods,
but in placing them in the world” (or, if one prefers, in the immanence
of the elements).16 As enlarged as it can be, the world remains the world.
The eternity of souls in Mormonism is of an elemental kind.

§ 3. Comparison
It is now possible to pursue a direct comparison between Lehi’s axiom
and Schelling’s law of opposition. First, then, the texts.
1. What I call “Lehi’s axiom” is a sentence attributed to the
first great prophetic figure in the Book of Mormon—“For it
must needs be, that there is an opposition in all things”—to
15. The monism of Mormonism—in its symmetry with pantheism—might be
better called theo-in-panism. It should be noted that this aspect of Mormon doctrine
appeared only eventually. The Book of Mormon itself inclines more to strict divine
transcendence.
16. Emmanuel Lévinas, “L’Actualité de Maïmonide,” Cahier de L’Herne, Emmanuel
Lévinas (1991): 144.
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which are appended first and second corollaries, as follows:
“If not so, . . . righteousness could not be brought to pass,
neither wickedness, neither holiness nor misery, neither
good nor bad. Wherefore, all things must needs be a compound in one” (2 Nephi 2:11).
2. In the middle of his intellectual career, Schelling formulates
his fundamental law of opposition in two different places:
first in the Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of
Human Freedom (1809) and second in the Stuttgart lectures
(1810) that assign a name to the law.
a. “Every essence can only reveal itself in its opposite, love
only in hate, unity in conflict.”17
b. “The fundamental law of opposition. Without opposition
no life, for man as for every existence in general.”18
It is after the double announcement of the coming of the Messiah
and of the necessity of a judgment that Lehi formulates his axiom. He
must explain why judgment envelops punishment and happiness as
opposites, judgment having to meet the requisites of atonement. Negating moral oppositions would lead to negating justice; it would be like
denying God’s existence. The book of Alma imagines this consequence
in striking terms: if the work of justice could be destroyed, God would
cease to be God (see Alma 42:13, 22, 25). Since God is the creator, according to Lehi, it is rather God who must put in question the existence
of the world (see 2 Nephi 2:13). It is thus clear that Lehi is not content
with acknowledging a stubborn, universal, moral, and cosmic or even
theological fact (the inevitability of evil) because he presents it as an
explanatory principle that gives meaning. That is, it reveals. It shows
function but also finality. It is the necessary condition of things. The
Doctrine and Covenants takes up the subject (and with more authority,
as it reports what are held to be God’s own words): “It must needs be
17. Schelling, Philosophical Investigations, 41.
18. F. W. J. Schelling, Sämmtliche Werke, 14 vols. (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1856–1861),
7:435.
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that the devil should tempt the children of men, or they could not be
agents unto themselves; for if they never should have bitter they could
not know the sweet” (D&C 29:39).
Lehi’s axiom is considered the condition, if not of freedom, at least
of its practice. The bitter and the sweet evoke the two fruits of Eden and
must be understood in a moral rather than in a physical sense since the
mechanical passage from pain to pleasure and back to the pain that is
the fate of human existence after the fall is not linked to any act of freedom. In ideational terms, what precedes evil is the fundamental law of
opposition itself that guarantees freedom. Evil does not proceed from
freedom. The latter is only the site of the emergence of evil.19
McMurrin thus takes the path of rational theodicy at the expense of
the text’s meaning when he chooses the explanation of opposition as a
raw fact that would leave God safe from any imputation of evil. What is
essential is not God but life, including divinity. Indeed, after the second
corollary, Lehi specifies that if nothing were composite and all things
were reducible to a single body, the divine would have neither life nor
sensibility. I should note that when I say that divinity itself is submitted
to oppositional polarity, I am alluding above all, in the immediate context, to the fall of the angel who becomes a demon because he sought
for what was evil before God—an event reported by Lehi (see 2 Nephi
2:17). But I am also alluding to a Mormon teaching that follows closely
the Book of Mormon, according to which Satan desired to be called
Elohim’s son by atoning for all of humanity. He demanded honor from
God as his reward (see Moses 4:1), an honor considered in the Doctrine
and Covenants as equivalent to divine power (see D&C 29:36).
It should be noted that, according to the just-mentioned account,
Satan claims to suspend Lehi’s axiom because of a desire to save all souls.
This is subtly insinuated, since the text reports the Father saying that, in
addition to rebelling against God, Satan was also trying to destroy man’s
agency (Moses 4:3). But opposition is, for Lehi, a condition of human
19. Neither Lehi nor Schelling would say, as does the Nusayri book Kitab al-Haft
wa-l-azillat (chapter 6), that God created Satan out of the transgressions and sins of the
believers.
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freedom: “Wherefore, the Lord God gave unto man that he should act
for himself. Wherefore, man could not act for himself save it should be
that he was enticed by the one or the other” (2 Nephi 2:16). The two trees
in paradise have become, here, symbols of a double postulate.
If there is irony in the Book of Moses account of Satan’s rebellion,
it is to be found in this unexpected project of Satan: instead of destroying opposition, he reinforces and figures it. He reinforces it by making
tangible the contrast that was latent between Christ (the true Son, as
the Father underscores) and Satan. And he figures it insofar as it is a
secret opposition (first to the Father, but perhaps also to the Son) that
encourages his candidacy. The power of reality is such that any maneuver must take it into consideration. Good cannot neglect the law of
opposition out of idealism. Not only would it fail lamentably, it would
also provoke in consequence a renewal of evil. The reverse is also clearly
true: an excess of evil brings renewed good. Carl Jung gives this law the
name of “enantiodromia,” a running in the opposite direction.
However, this convocation of opposites maintains a mechanical
and external character as long as the opposites are not revealed one in
the other. Not only is one felt by contrast with the other, as with sour
and sweet, but one comes through the other, which makes Schelling’s
intervention in this question so precious. I would thus distinguish four
states of the law of opposition, starting with the least, as follows:
1. The coexistence of contraries. This consists in the simple
fact that things are mixed. The idea is palpable in Lehi’s
discourse, but Giordano Bruno puts it into service: “Nothing is pure and simple. . . . All things consist of opposites,
and thus the events that befall our emotions, because of
the compounding that exists in things, cannot provide any
enjoyment without some complement of bitterness.”20 We
recognize in Bruno’s words Lehi’s axiom, as well as its second corollary, with the difference that for Lehi it is good and
20. Giordano Bruno, On the Heroic Frenzies, trans. Ingrid D. Rowland, ed. Eugenio
Canone (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013), 65.
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necessary that things are submitted to compositeness—and
that alters the entire perspective. For his part, Bruno prefers
the middle region where the extremes cancel each other
out.21
2. The negative reciprocal determination of contraries. Bruno
goes on: “Indeed, I further declare and note that if there
were no bitterness in things, there would be no enjoyment,
because our exertions make us take pleasure in resting.”22
It is not by itself that a word is present to another, but by
its absence, which connects to the linguistic theory of the
zero degree. Bruno risks introducing the notion of causality: “[If we] examine matters in general, it will always be the
case that one extreme provides the reason that its opposite
becomes the object of longing and the source of pleasure.”23
But this law of contrasts only expresses a causality by default, against which the first corollary of Lehi’s axiom inveighs, since it places the stakes at the level of morals and
salvation in a way that implies freedom.
3. The positive reciprocal determination of contraries. Here causality is active and the law is truly dynamic. What is essential for Lehi is that the axiom ensures the basis for freedom.
Without duality, there is no choice, and without duality of opposition, there is no ethical or religious choice, because there
is only a choice of one term against another—something that
Schelling conceived perfectly, since for him conflict is the
main element of life and evil must be awakened in order to
be overcome.24 It is thanks to this polarity that the spark of
life is communicated to the whole being. The second corollary redounds on the axiom and explains it, permitting its
relocation from the first state of the law to the third state. But
21.
22.
23.
24.

See ibid., 69, 71.
Ibid., 65.
Ibid.
See Schelling, Philosophical Investigations, 63–64.
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Schelling’s theory includes an extra element, and thus it is
advisable to consider a fourth state of the law of opposition.
4. The positive reciprocal determination of contraries as a revelation of each. Lehi supposes that good and evil are known,
which causes some problems, since the boundary between
them is blurry. First they must be defined, and then we need
to be sure that one is not mistaken for the other. There are
still more subtle confusions. We might correctly say that the
better is the enemy of the good, and thus grant good two
enemies: evil and that excess of good that very well might,
out of an unwilling enantiodromy, call up the evil that it is
not. A first conclusion, then, is that the apprehension of a
reality implies the perfect knowledge of its contrary.25
Even if Schelling’s thought touches on these issues, the essential
point comes at an earlier stage and concerns the apparition of good and
evil. Love requires hate as its opposite in order to be effective,26 which
amounts to saying that it remains latent without its opposite (Gegenteil).
Indeed, love as a simple disposition is hardly more than impotence. That
“hardly more” is, however, of high value because it is a lever, albeit at
rest: a promise of fulfillment. For it to be fulfilled, it requires the element
of conflict mentioned above—it must wrestle with hate. To appear (and
appear here really means “to be”), it must win over an adverse force. Of
course, the nature of hate complicates matters, since it is not inert, as
if evil was a defect of good, a hole in being, the resistance of matter, or
the end of an effort. Hatred must always oppose; it is not indifference. It
searches for love in order to bring it down, and it would be timid if it did
not find love, which is why it happens that evil can provoke good, not
only after the fact (because of enantiodromy) but beforehand, in order
to fulfill itself as evil, to achieve its highest degree. It is said that Gilles de
25. For example, “Only he who already knows his opposite through and through
can look the spiritual right in the eye.” F. W. J. Schelling, Clara, or, On Nature’s Connection to the Spirit World, trans. Fiona Steinkamp (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2002), 28.
26. See Schelling, Philosophical Investigations, 41.
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Rais, the greatest criminal of all time, imagined a scenario in which he
would try to get his child victims to love him before he stabbed them.27
Evil is the site of the revelation of good.
Schelling agrees with Lehi that there cannot be good or evil without
opposition to justice or holiness. This assertion is sufficient in opening
up space for freedom and retribution. But the philosopher goes further
than the prophet in thinking that man’s freedom is the act by which
good and evil become what they are. For Schelling, freedom itself must
begin by putting itself in its contrary (that is, necessity) in order to
become efficient.28
Here is a second conclusion: what is at stake is not only a choice
between two realities, but their coming into being. For opposites to be
revealed one in the other, it is not enough to oppose indifference. Hatred, for instance, must be at its peak, its maximum of self-manifestation
as hatred of love, if it is to be the very thing that must be vanquished
by love. It is not without reason that Christ considers the sin against
the Spirit as unatoneable. Indeed, this sin consists in declaring that the
Man of Nazareth practices his healing gifts by the power of the devil. Is
this not a claim that good is evil, and does this claim not thus seek to
deliver a fatal blow to the good? It is, in any event, in this way that good
and evil are at opposite ends of banality and must confront each other.
This essential opposition is widely visible in the Book of Mormon, with
no need for Lehi’s axiom to underscore it.
In the blasphemous equation of good and evil (“good is evil”), the
copula (is) may be understood in its analytic sense. The same equation can be found in Schelling’s text, however, in order to express its
dialectical value: to say that this is that is to say that this is the foundation of that. In other words, evil does not possess in itself the power of
being.29 But the philosopher only formulates the equation to express

27. See Jad Hatem, L’Écharde du mal dans la chair de Dieu [The splinter of evil in
God’s flesh] (Paris: Cariscript, 1987), chapter 3, section 7.
28. See the discussion in F. W. J. Schelling, The Ages of the World, trans. Jason M.
Wirth (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2000). See also Schelling, Clara, 28.
29. See Schelling, Philosophical Investigations, 13.
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the copula as such. The idea proper—that good is subject to evil—is of
Thomist origin. Schelling uses the expression in a context particular to
his thought when he claims that “good and evil are the same thing only
seen from different sides, or evil is in itself, that is, considered in the
root of its identity, the good, just as the good, to the contrary, considered
in its turning from itself or non-identity, is evil.”30 Not that these two
realities can be confused, of course, but they are only distinguished by
their form. Good and evil combine differently the universal will and
the particular will that are found in all things. In the good, universal
prevails over particular, and the reverse pertains in evil, which makes of
it a perversion rather than a privation of good. Instead of repeating that
cold and heat may only be felt in contrast, Schelling claims something
totally different. Cold can only be felt because the body is susceptible to
opposites, and these opposites are composed of the same ingredients,
the difference residing in their arrangement, even if this arrangement
is determined by an element that comes from outside, the other root,
which confirms that good is no less apt to fight than evil.31

§ 4. God and Opposition
When Lehi says that there must necessarily be an opposition in all
things, he does not exclude anything or anyone. As God is submitted
explicitly by Leibniz to the principle of sufficient reason, he is implicitly submitted by Lehi to the law of opposition. I have already evoked
the opposition in divinity that emerges at the moment of the rivalry
between Lucifer and Christ, which merely reflects the rivalry between
the Father and the insidious candidate for the Father’s divinity. The
moment has arrived to demand a new argument.
Mormon doctrine claims the idea of God’s mutability. But it cannot
do without an internal and an external opposition. If I may intervene
in a quarrel among Mormon theologians about whether God became

30. Ibid., 63–64.
31. Ibid. See also Plato, Republic 491e.
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changeless or still depends on a dynamic perfection, I would say that
Lehi’s axiom encourages the second hypothesis. One can, of course,
imagine many things about the nature of opposition in God (one might
consider it to be sexual, for instance, as in the Kabbalah). But it would
be best to ask Schelling, for whom God originates from the Groundless,
which, being nondifference, does not allow for opposition as such but
could still contain distinct principles that would only be opposed in
their manifested state.32 For example, Schelling regards evil as latent in
the Absolute as a possibility, and it only arises into being to be eternally
overcome. Latent good, moreover, only comes to be through overcoming, by which the opposed force that has been overcome is maintained
as raw material.
I offer one example, taken from the Stuttgart lectures of 1810: God
raises one of the principles that constitute him (selfishness) above another (love) such that creation becomes possible without endangering
God’s existence, since selfishness, which expresses ipseity, must be preserved.33 If selfishness dominated love, God would be inverted, and
rather than pantheism, pandemonism would have held sway! It is in
this context that Schelling writes,
For the ordinary, abstract mode of understanding, it seems surprising that God should contain a non-divine principle, without
consciousness and lesser than him. To conceive God as an empty
identity, however, is not to comprehend him at all. The necessity
of this hypothesis can be proven by means of the fundamental law
of opposition. Without opposition no life, for man as for every
existence in general.34

The Absolute must itself go through separation and opposition so
that life may make its shining appearance. But Schelling’s God aspires
throughout history to be all and to be in all, such that all oppositions

32. See Schelling, Philosophical Investigations, 68–69.
33. Schelling, Sämmtliche Werke, 7:439.
34. Ibid., 7:435.
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are appeased.35 If opposition is a fact of being, as Lehi claims, it is understandable that no fulfillment can put an end to it. If it is an element
of revelation, as Schelling teaches, we can easily allow ourselves to hope
that it will lose its acuity in proportion as the mystery is elucidated—
that is to say, that love will reign. “The non-ground divides itself into
the two exactly equal beginnings, only so that the two, which could not
exist simultaneously or be one in it as the non-ground, become one
through love, that is, it divides itself only so that there may be life and
love and personal existence.”36 We understand that hatred must first be
made manifest. But God is not directly capable of the power of good
and evil: a relative impotence of God, but oh so reassuring!
On scission and the hope for union, the young Schelling of his First
Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature wrote some inspired
lines. Although they concern Nature, I dare to believe that they are also
applicable to God and to the fundamental law of opposition:
Nature is the laziest of animals and curses separation because it
imposes upon it the necessity of activity; Nature is active only in
order to rid itself of this compulsion. The opposites must forever
shun, in order forever to seek each other; and forever seek, in order
never to find each other; it is only in this contradiction that the
ground of all the activity of Nature lies.37

35.
36.
37.
Keith

See Schelling, Philosophical Investigations, 70.
Ibid.
F. W. J. Schelling, First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature, trans.
R. Peterson (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2004), 231.
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Yahweh Is Jesus
§ 1.
Because several names are proposed for the biblical God—certain
of them acknowledged as proper names, others as common names—the
temptation is strong to correlate divinity to qualities, to hypostases, and
even to distinct entities. In tracing the word divinity, I prepare in this
essay the possibility of a way out of strict monotheism.
As an example, the precious Gnostic document entitled the Apocryphon of John recounts that Yaldabaoth fathered two sons by Eve: the
bear-faced Yahweh and the cat-faced Elohim—the first unjust and the
second just—better known by the names Abel and Cain.1 One will note
that the two divine names designate different personages with the nature of Gnostic archons (which, according to the Gnostics, does not
ultimately distinguish these personages from the Old Testament demiurge) and that their respective value is inverted in relation to the text
of Genesis: the performer of the bloodless sacrifice is preferred over his
brother. But fairness does not confer the grace of goodness.
In the pages that follow, I propose to analyze two traditions inspired
by Christian gnosis that confer upon Jesus the name of Yahweh to the
exclusion of the Father.

1. See James M. Robinson, The Nag Hammadi Library, rev. ed. (San Francisco:
HarperCollins, 1988), 118–19.
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§ 2.
Certain exegetes, the Mormons among them,2 derive the proper name
Yahweh, the causative form of the imperfect tense of the Hebrew verb
hawah (to become), from Ehyeh (I Am), which comes from the selfrevelation of God to Moses: “I Am that I Am” (Exodus 3:14). The Mormons use this derivation to identify Yahweh with Jesus Christ on the basis
of two things: (1) the fact that the latter pronounces “I am” in the New
Testament (John 8:58) and then makes a name of the phrase in their own
unique scriptures: “Listen to the voice of Jesus Christ, your Redeemer, the
Great I Am, whose arm of mercy hath atoned for your sins” (D&C 29:1);
(2) the significance of his name—Yehoshua: literally, Yahweh saves—so
that it would be him who, master of the work of sacred history, both gave
the law to Moses (see 3 Nephi 15:5) and then took upon him flesh: “the
God of Abraham, and of Isaac, and the God of Jacob, yieldeth himself,
according to the words of the angel, as a man” (1 Nephi 19:10). Thus
James E. Talmage comments:
Jesus of Nazareth, who in solemn testimony to the Jews declared
Himself the I Am or Jehovah, who was God before Abraham lived
on earth, was the same Being who is repeatedly proclaimed as the
God who made covenant with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob; the God
who led Israel from the bondage of Egypt to the freedom of the
promised land, the one and only God known by revelation to the
Hebrew prophets.3

Talmage’s formulation “the one and only God” here does not serve
the proponent of monotheism. It serves, rather, to exclude God the Father from candidacy for the title of Yahweh (even though the canonical
Mormon books hardly invite this exclusion)4—not that the Father has
2. See, for example, James E. Talmage, Jesus the Christ: A Study of the Messiah and His
Mission according to Holy Scriptures Both Ancient and Modern (Salt Lake City: The Deseret
News, 1915).
3. Ibid., 38.
4. For instance, it is more probable that, considering context, it is to the Heavenly Father
that the name Jehovah is attributed throughout section 109 of the Doctrine and Covenants.
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no role to play, but he confines himself to attesting to the dignity of his
Son and inviting people to listen to him (see 3 Nephi 11:7). When it is
professed in the Book of Mormon that “there is one God and one Shepherd over all the earth” (1 Nephi 13:41), it is helpful to understand that
this refers exclusively to the Son. While John’s prologue makes the Only
Begotten the instrument of the inaugural act, Mormon scripture—in
spite of the Nicene Creed—attributes the creation to the Son exclusively:
“My hand hath also laid the foundation of the earth, and my right hand
hath spanned the heavens. I call unto them and they stand up together”
(1 Nephi 20:13). The Son thus inherits in Mormonism attributes that
the patristic tradition confers foremost on the Father: omnipotens, omnicreans, omnitenens.5 It is notable that, in general, the Book of Mormon
rarely departs from the standard practice of translating the Tetragrammaton (the four sacred letters lying behind the voiced name Jehovah) as
“Lord.”6 The use of Jehovah becomes somewhat more commonplace in
the Doctrine and Covenants. In the Pearl of Great Price, the Lord (“the
Lord my God”) gives himself the name Jehovah (see Abraham 1:16).
A Book of Mormon passage that declares that Christ is both Father
and Son is problematic, even for the Mormons. According to the text, he
is “the Father, because he was conceived by the power of God; and the
Son, because of the flesh” (Mosiah 15:2–3; cf. Ether 3:14). The official
explanation for this is layered: Christ is the Father (1) inasmuch as he is
the creator of all things, (2) by virtue of his sacrifice for those who recognize it, and (3) because of the investiture he receives from his Father.7
The name Elohim, absent from the Book of Mormon, is one Mormons
eventually reserved for the Father, of whom Yahweh is the firstborn son.8
But before this relatively late and unexpected development in Mormon
teaching, elohim was used as a common name or predicate by the religion’s
5. See Augustine, The Literal Meaning of Genesis IV.12; Augustine, Confessions
11.3–8.
6. For examples, see 2 Nephi 22:2 and Moroni 10:34, the last verse in the book.
7. This is clarified in a well-known declaration made by the First Presidency on
June 30, 1916. See James E. Talmage, Articles of Faith (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book,
1982), 466–67.
8. Ibid., 472.
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founder, Joseph Smith, who, discovering that the word is a Hebrew plural,
hastened to make further use of it in professing polytheism.9
We observe, then, that the Mormon exegetes take, so to speak, the
path opposite that of the redactors of the Pentateuch—who belonged
to two different parties aligning with two distinct theologies, so much
so that the Yahweh of the Yahwist barely resembles the Elohim of the
Elohist and the Priestly Code. The redactors of the books attributed to
Moses produced a harmonization, such that in the end the two names
Yahweh and Elohim could be associated (as in the Hebrew of Genesis
2:7, for example), and the same sequence could make them succeed
each other—it being well understood, in the spirit of the common
reader, that the referent of the terms remains the same.

§ 3.
But what is the goal of the Mormon distribution of divine names? And
is it likely to determine the specificity of the Son?
The first answer to come to mind is that the distinction between
Elohim and Yahweh supports an anti-Trinitarian argument. In effect,
for traditional Christianity, Elohim is the common name of three hypostases. (Even better, it is a plural controlling a singular verb.) Even if
the Holy Name is often attributed to the Father, it is equally valid when
applied to the Trinity, and thus to the Son. As in John Donne’s writings,
Christ may at times be distinguished from Yahweh, the latter taken
as equivalent to Being,10 but this gesture is exceptional. On the other
hand, it is not rare to see the Tetragrammaton engraved in the frescoes

9. See Andrew F. Ehat and Lyndon W. Cook, eds., The Words of Joseph Smith:
The Contemporary Accounts of the Nauvoo Discourses of the Prophet Joseph (Provo, UT:
Religious Studies Center, Brigham Young University, 1980), 379. In the Pearl of Great
Price, the “gods” organize the world (see Abraham 4).
10. “Man in general hath relation to God, as he is Jehovah, Being; we have relation
to Christ, as he is Jesus, our salvation; salvation is our being, Jesus is our Jehovah.” John
Donne, The Works of John Donne, 6 vols. (London: John W. Parker, 1839), 2:383–84
(Sermon 48, on Psalm 6:1).
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representing Christ as a testament to his divinity and his consubstantiality with the Father, which justifies one in saying that it is Christ the
Lord who led Israel out of Egypt.11
Now, if the Mormons confess the divinity of the Son (whatever their
concept of divinity is at the moment), they reject consubstantiality—in
consequence of which one finds before one a divine triad rather than a
divine trinity. It is interesting to note that another theory that distances
itself from Trinitarian dogma, namely the Arianism of Jehovah’s Witnesses, has taken the opposite tack to Mormonism, seeing it confers the
name Yahweh uniquely on the Father because it does not consider the
Son identical to or of the same nature as the Father (i.e., the Uncreated).
One is led, therefore, to an original configuration when one reads in
Mormon writings that Yahweh is Jesus, and not the Father.
I said just now that in the mind of the common reader of the Pentateuch, the referent remains the same whether one says “Elohim” or
“Yahweh.” But the common reader is hardly the only reader. In the
Kabbalah, the two names refer back to different Sephirot—which,
while being distinct entities, are no less than expressions of the one
Deity (the Infinite) deployed in ten ways that are at once centered on
themselves and communicative of themselves to others. In this layered
deployment of the Deity, Yahweh correlates primarily to the Sephira
Tipheret,12 whereas the name of Elohim fits in the same way with the
Sephira Malkuth.13 The two Sephirot illustrate the particularity of being
called to couple as masculine and feminine (or sun and moon).14 This is
to say that they constitute a sort of dyad at the heart of the decad. As it
is Elohim who governs the earth, he is perforce known by all peoples,

11. This is the case of Assemani, even though he does not evoke the work ad extra
of the Trinity. See Giuseppe Simone Assemani, Kitab al-Ilahiyyat (Zouk Mosbeh: Notre
Dame University–Louaize Press, 2003), 1059.
12. See Zohar 1.150b. To be more specific: primarily because Yahweh can represent all the Sephirot, since he is at the center of everything, he can assure their coalescence (see ibid., 193b). Among the patriarchs, it is Jacob who represents Tipheret.
13. See ibid., 1.22a, 1.144b, 1.150b.
14. See ibid., 1.144b.
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but that is not so in the case of Yahweh, reserved for Israel, who manifests himself in mercy only when the righteous are found in the world.15
The remarkable thing about this, if one were to propose a quick
comparison between Kabbalah and Mormonism, is that Elohim takes
second position in the Zohar, whereas he is first in Mormon thought.16
In both cases, Yahweh is called Son,17 but in the Kabbalah this is for the
simple reason that he issues from greater Sephirot. We retrieve from this
analysis the idea that the two divine names are dissociable in the two
traditions—Mormonism and Kabbalah. But there is a way to go forward
by having recourse to Christian Kabbalah, which, taking license from
the Zoharic, proceeds to the same disjunction and above all confers on
Jesus the title of Yahweh exclusive of the Father.
The initiator of this gesture is Pico della Mirandola, who, in his
Conclusions, announces: “The three great four-letter names of God,
which exist in the secrets of the Cabalists, through miraculous appropriation should be attributed to the three Persons of the Trinity like this:
so that the name Ehyeh is that of the Father, the name YHVH of the Son,
the name Adonai of the Holy Spirit.”18 To the Father, therefore, goes the
seminal name Ehyeh; to the son, Yahweh, the name derivative of the
seminal one; and to the Spirit, Adonai, lordship. Now the name of Yahweh, since it befits the Son, must equally be applied to the Christ: “By
the name Yod he vav he, which is the ineffable name that the Cabalists
say will be the name of the Messiah,19 it is clearly known that he will be
God the Son of God made man through the Holy Spirit.”20

15. See ibid., 1.195a.
16. This is often understood differently when Elohim is identified with Gevurah,
as in Moses de Léon, Le Sicle du sanctuaire [The Shekel of the Sanctuary], trans. Ch.
Mopsik (Lagrasse: Verdier, 1996), 284.
17. See Zohar 1.124b.
18. Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Syncretism in the West: Pico’s 900 Theses
(1486): The Evolution of Traditional Religious and Philosophical Systems, ed. Stephen A.
Farmer (Tempe, AZ: Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 1998), 523.
19. Cf. Babylonian Talmud Baba Batra 75v.
20. Pico della Mirandola, Conclusions, 527.
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Two of the letters (composing, incidentally, the Tetragrammaton)
play a particular role, for Pico, in the conception of the human nature
of the Savior: “Through the mystery of the two letters vav and yod, it is
known in what way the Messiah as God was the beginning of himself as
man.”21 Regarding the seminal name, we note that the Kabbalists of the
ʿIyyun group maintain that the true name of God, he who is the source
of EHYH and YHVH, is EHVY.22 In this way, they ascend towards the
abyss of the origin of the deity.23
It is remarkable that Pico, instead of explicitly identifying the Trinity with the three greater Sephirot—Keter, Chokhmah, and Binah, those
which Kabbalah itself exalts—chose to arrange the whole group in a
sephirotic tree. In effect, Ehyeh traditionally designates the Sephira
Keter,24 the chiefest of the Sephirot. YHVH Tipheret occupies the middle of the tree, running between the Hebrew letter he above (Binah) and
the letter he below (Malkuth).25 As for Adonai, it refers to the Sephira
Malkuth.26 The Zohar eventually reunites these three names, but with
a fourth, Tsevaot, applied to the Sephira Yessod,27 whose nature it is to
bring together all the Sephirot of the central column in whom the left
and the right find equilibrium and who, in and beginning with Tipheret,
ponders Strictness with Mercy.
If one insists on the messianic idea, Tipheret gains importance and
monopolizes all divine substance, as happens with the Messiah Sabbatai
21. Ibid., 539.
22. Cf. Gershom Scholem, Le Nom et les symboles de Dieu dans la mystique juive
[The name and symbols of God in Jewish mysticism], trans. M. Hayoun and G. Vajda
(Paris: Cerf, 1983), 79.
23. Translator’s note: This is a paradox Hatem invoked in his discussion about the
various messianic figures who increase in virtue and enlightenment only to descend further into the depths of the human condition to help those whose suffering or sinfulness
is most abject and profound.
24. For example, Moses de Léon, Le Sicle du sanctuaire, 278–80. Sometimes Binah
or Chokhmah.
25. See Le Zohar, Cantique des cantiques [The Zohar: Song of Songs], trans. Ch.
Mopsik (Lagrasse: Verdier, 1999), 59.
26. See ibid., 286.
27. Zohar 2.61d.
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Zevi, except Zevi dared not identify himself with divinity but by an
ascendant participation in it (a movement in the opposite direction to
that of the Word, who takes on flesh). Johann Reuchlin, who also considers the ineffable Name proper to the Messiah,28 inserts into the sacred
Name the Hebrew letter shin, which is supposed to render the name of
Jesus as Messiah—YHShVH—all to insist on his relationship to Mercy.29
In conclusion, if we agree that the Yahweh of the Kabbalah casts light
on the Mormon Yahweh, it would appear that, besides the messianic
character discussed throughout the book to which this essay is appended,
he possesses the attributes of peace and truth, which are, according to
the Bahir, the fundamental traits of the sixth Sephira. We add to them
the coalescing power, but not the equilibrium of contrasting positions,
because the Mormon Yahweh aligns with the paternal will in emphasizing
his opposition to the will of Lucifer, who serves as antagonist, and for
this he does not synthesize being in reconciling that will with himself.30 It
must not be forgotten that Tipheret means “beauty,” and thus “harmony.”
The Mormon Yahweh aims for the heights through opposition, whereas
the Zoharic Yahweh unifies in his breast the contraries that the divinity
knew to put in place.

28. See Johann Reuchlin, On the Art of the Kabbalah, trans. Martin and Sarah
Goodman (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1993), 113.
29. See ibid., xix. Zohar 1.100b proposes its own nominative fusion between
YHVH and ADNY for the good reason that the second is the qere of the first, which
gives YAHDVNHY.
30. See appendix 1, “The Fundamental Law of Opposition: Lehi and Schelling.”
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Interview with Jad Hatem
James E. Faulconer
In April 2014 I sent Jad Hatem a series of questions about his book
Postponing Heaven, hoping he might say something about the origin
of the book and also that our discussion might tease out some of its
implications. Hatem’s responses were thoughtful and informative,
not only relating how he came to write Postponing Heaven, but also
comparing Jesus Christ’s work with the work of the bodhisattva and
saying more about what he means by “Nephite-Mahdite time.” Even
more important, Hatem explains why he believes that the story of the
Three Nephites is more central to the Book of Mormon and perhaps
to Mormon self-understanding than scholars of Mormonism have
previously recognized.
—James E. Faulconer

James E. Faulconer: American readers will be surprised to find that
a Lebanese philosopher has written a book that deals with not only
Islam and Buddhism, but Mormonism. Can you tell us how this book
came about?
Jad Hatem: The book is a result of a passion and a circumstance. I
have a passion for religions in general, each of which I take to embody
the attempt to decipher the mystery of human being in terms of its animating transcendent dimension. The circumstance was a course I gave
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in 2007 on Mormon doctrine. The course made me discover the point
of contact between Mormonism, Buddhism, and Shiʿite Islam. That
gradually suggested the possibility of writing a short book combining
the philosophical point of view (implementing the transcendental of
messianicity) and the point of view of the academic study of religions,
without neglecting the literary dimension—since I did a fair bit of work
on the novels of Orson Scott Card to support my argument.
As for the two essays appended to the main work: During my stay
at BYU in 2008, at your invitation, I had the opportunity to take part in
the meetings of the Society for Mormon Philosophy and Theology that
took place that year at the University of Utah. I took that opportunity
to develop the theme of chapter 6 of this book, “Lehi’s Axiom,” through
a confrontation with Schelling. I am among those who believe in the
virtue of comparison.
The idea of the second essay came to me while reading Pico della
Mirandola: I brought together two distant stars. Needless to say, through
that meditation I found a way of satisfying my passion for Christology.
I would add that I have also published a comparative study of Catholicism and Mormonism on the question of Christ’s will in Gethsemane
(in my Les Agonies du Christ [Éditions du Cygne, 2010], chapter 2).
JEF: I notice that your book is dedicated to someone who is a Latterday Saint leader in Lebanon, Karim Assouad. Can you tell us something
about your reasons for that dedication?
JH: When I began work on the article that eventually developed
into this book, I was short on resources. I had only read the Book of
Mormon. I asked my students if any of them knew of a member of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints living in Lebanon. One of
them gave me the telephone number of a local Mormon leader. That
same day, I met him and obtained the Pearl of Great Price and a copy of
the Doctrine and Covenants. Then he lent me the entire seven-volume
History of the Church. A sense of fellow-feeling developed between
us then and strengthened over time to become a genuine friendship.
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Therefore it seemed natural for me to dedicate the book to him. And I
must attribute the fact that he tirelessly tries to convert me to his faith
to his good feelings toward me.
JEF: In your book you suggest that the writing of the Book of Mormon probably began with 3 Nephi. Can you explain more fully your
reasoning for that conclusion? Is that assumption important to your
understanding of the Book of Mormon? If so, how?
JH: The hypothesis to which you refer is based on my belief that
the central kernel of the Book of Mormon is ethico-soteric in character
and not, for example, mystic. What 3 Nephi highlights is the desire to
devote one’s life (prolonged or not) to the salvation of others. The spiritual experiences reported by Joseph Smith as visual and aural revelation
seem to me to be oriented toward that mission.
JEF: Royal Skousen’s critical text project (which only came to fruition after your book was published) has made reasonably clear that
Joseph Smith and Oliver Cowdery began their work on the Book of
Mormon with what is now the book of Mosiah. How does that development in Book of Mormon research change (or not) your thoughts on
this issue? Is it possible to see all of the section from Mosiah through
3 Nephi as anticipating and working toward the ethico-soteriological
concerns of 3 Nephi?
JH: There are good reasons to grant the book of Mosiah primacy
insofar as it refers to the brass plates written in Egyptian, plates whose
reading is necessary to safeguard the discourse (see Mosiah 1:2–5).
Speaking as a nonbeliever, I see that as a good starting point for Joseph
Smith, who needed to convey a similar conviction to his contemporaries. In proposing in my book that 3 Nephi was the starting point for
Joseph Smith’s dictations of the Book of Mormon, my judgment obviously proceeded not from philological analysis, but from an intuition
that didn’t get much beyond intuition. That intuition definitely lay in
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how I understood Joseph Smith’s state of mind when he embarked on
his project. I find it difficult to imagine that it was not part of Joseph
Smith’s idea from the outset to ground his own version of sacred history
in a parallel manifestation of Christ (on American soil).
JEF: You say that the Three Nephites are “the three mysterious pillars upon which the church is built.” Is that a comment about the LDS
Church and contemporary Mormonism? Does the story of the Three
Nephites and your analysis of that story suggest anything about Mormon
self-understanding, not just what it is, but what it might or should be?
JH: All I can say is that the approach usually taken toward the story
of the Three Nephites has been folkloric, and I felt that, instead, the
episode deserved to be considered philosophically.
JEF: You say “the bodhisattva [exerts himself] in order to be able to
share what he accumulates, the Christ in sharing what he has already
won.” How do the terms in-place-of-others and beneath-others apply to
the work of the bodhisattva and that of Christ? Are they in tension?
How do those terms apply to the work of the Three Nephites?
JH: Rather than tension, the relation is that of complementarity
between two types of substitution (beneath-others, in-place-of-others).
What is essential to the Three Nephites, the bodhisattva, and the Mahdi
is precisely that they cannot fulfill their mission by dying for others. If
they sacrifice their own existence, it is only by consecrating it. In their
eyes the world remains present even if sometimes terribly so. Thus they
are not examples of Paul Celan’s very beautiful line—“The world is no
more, I must carry you” (Die Welt ist fort, ich muß dich tragen). Nonetheless they connect with that poetic line by their phoric gesture (the
fact of carrying, of being pillars). The Three Nephites do not imitate
Christ by dying for others since, precisely, they are preserved in order
to come to the aid of humanity—that aid is the work of conversion no
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doubt, but also, if one is to believe the folklore, of punctual interventions to help out this or that person.
JEF: It is not unusual for Mormon intellectuals to be attracted by
the metaphysics of Buddhism. But your understanding of the Three
Nephites puts them in contrast with the bodhisattva. Does that suggest that the attraction of Buddhism for some Mormons may include
a misunderstanding?
JH: It seems to me that the Buddhism that attracts Mormons is
probably that of the Lesser Vehicle (Hīnayāna Buddhism), which is
more strictly materialist, metaphysically. It is clear that what I have mobilized in my study is the Buddhism of the Greater Vehicle (Mahāyāna
Buddhism), which admits the immateriality of essence. And in any case,
the point of convergence that I have underscored pertains to the ethical,
rather than the metaphysical, sphere.
JEF: This is one of my favorite quotations in your book:
Put another way, in Christianity human fulness models itself
after the divine fulness of the second hypostasis of the Trinity;
in Mahāyāna Buddhism, hypostasis must first dissolve itself so
that the “I” can become all others. But precisely because of this
emptiness, this last gesture is in everyone’s reach, while because
of the divine (and indissoluble) fulness of the second hypostasis,
the Christian act is unique. The Three Nephites naturally dwell
below these figures because neither their ontological constitution
nor their vocation authorizes them to attend to humanity except
nominally, for their Messiah is already doing it effectively.

Can you say anything more about this observation? What, for example,
does this suggest about someone like Joseph Smith, who presumably
had contemporaneous experience with the Three Nephites and was
certainly contemporaneous with Mormon and Moroni, who were
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ministered to by the Three Nephites? What might it say for the contemporaneity of today’s Latter-day Saints?
JH: I might summarize the point of the lines you quote as follows:
the Three Nephites have the power neither to save the world (something
already accomplished anyway) nor to annihilate their egos in order to
be able to substitute themselves for all others indiscriminately.
That said, it is difficult for me to respond to the second part of your
question, that about Joseph Smith. Did he meet our three persons? One
must be a Mormon (1) to suppose the existence of the Three Nephites
(and all other Nephites and Lamanites) and, so, (2) to admit the possibility of such meetings. The question of contemporaneity is nevertheless
essential in a phenomenological approach to the consciousness of being
Mormon. I explain in this book why Joseph Smith, being a prophet, did
not need to personally experience contemporaneousness with Christ
through the mediation of the Three Nephites. In spite of that, the faithful could feel (and have felt) that such an encounter was necessary.
This is also primarily a question of testimony: I can see and hear
those who have seen and heard. We understand the importance of this
when we remember that the faith of the Christian tradition as a whole
depends entirely on the testimonies of women and men who witnessed
the resurrection of Christ.
JEF: Another of my favorite quotations:
The contemporaneity of the Three Nephites cannot ignore eschatological expectation, for their duration unravels a time-for-others
charged with guaranteeing the continuation of history. The future
dwells in coming. What mediates between worlds is the creative
synthesis of the promise and of time (itself a combination of spirit
and of world) such that history has at its immanent center a purely
human standard-bearer.

Can you say more about your claim?
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JH: It is not enough to be the contemporary of a contemporary. One
must also become such—in other words, to become aware of it as a task.
Mormons must think that the Three Nephites can be imitated so as to
make more likely the possibility of choosing between the two forms of
substitution discussed before. But if we look more precisely at their ontological (rather than ethical) specificity, we see that specificity (namely,
their prolonged temporality) as a living bridge thrown between the
original Christian revelation and the “latter days” in which Mormonism
arises. Insofar as Mormonism accuses the Christian tradition of apostasy (that is, of a long rupture with the truth), it ought to be grateful to
the Three Nephites (and the Apostle John) for preserving continuity.
JEF: What is the theological significance of the occultation of holy
people—the nistar, the Mahdi, the Three Nephites? You say that continual presence would mean that “a theology of presence would have
prevailed over a theology of hope,” but what gives the theology of hope
a positive valence in comparison to a theology of presence?
JH: A theology of presence deprives human beings of their liberty
if God manifests himself as such in person, that is to say, by imposing
himself in the full revelation of what he is. In that case, everything has
been done, and the mortal person would have no other choice than to
recognize and to obey him absolutely. But if a man of God shows himself as such, people are only partially deprived of their liberty because
they continue to have room for faith. A person might not recognize the
validity of the testimony of the prophet (or Messiah, etc.). Furthermore,
not everything has been done. Time has not been entirely unfolded,
ensuring that there is room for mystery, waiting, struggle, and hope.
JEF: You note that Joseph Smith put into place a system that safeguards prophecy from one president to the next rather than a system
that would have allowed the occulted Three Nephites to act through a
deputy. That, you say, explains the church’s present structure. But don’t
you think that would also suggest a preference for theological reflection
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rather than personal revelation? Yet the LDS Church continues to emphasize direct encounter with the supratemporal at the same time that
it safeguards the position of the Prophet.
JH: Of course I am no specialist in Mormon theology. But perhaps
you are right. If so, then that suggests that there is a tension in Mormon
history between the two kinds of contemporaneity. The institution wins
out over anarchic shifts, certainly. But it runs alongside a popular belief
in direct encounters with mediating angels.
JEF: You say, “And finally there is Nephite-Mahdite time, which
introduces into the pulsation of human time a presence that endures
and witnesses, the presence of a human being laboring and struggling,
and not the presence of an institution, were it divinely established, or of
a people, had it been set apart for the sanctification of the Holy Name.”
You are reasonably well acquainted with the Latter-day Saints. To what
degree do you think that the fold of messianic time and its assumption
of Nephite-Mahdite time is effective in present Latter-day Saint religious
practice? To what degree do you think it is in danger of being overtaken
by secular or some other time?
JH: The caveat I offered to the previous question applies equally
well here. Given what I’ve already said about the possibility of a tension
between two kinds of contemporaneity in Mormonism, perhaps the
institution of the church or the people of the church has exactly replaced
the Nephite-Mahdite experience of time. In that case, the sublation of
the two kinds of contemporaneity by merely secular or secularizing
time may have already occurred or be occurring. Like most other people, many Mormons are understandably skeptical of the folklore stories
of the Three Nephites. Miracles seem impossible, especially when they
deal with such things as flat tires. The longevity ascribed to the Nephites
seems impossible. But perhaps that skepticism on the part of Mormons
has as much to do with the loss of the Nephite-Mahdite experience of
time as with anything else.
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